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In their eagerness to reward celebrities for the power of their “images,” and to 
prevent other people from exploiting those images, courts have allowed the right of 
publicity to distort the First Amendment.  The power of the visual image has 
allowed courts to create an inconsistent, overly expansive regime that would be 
easily understood as constitutionally unacceptable were the same rules applied to 
written words as are applied to drawings and video games.  The intersection of a 
conceptually unbounded right with a category of objects that courts do not handle 
well has created deep inconsistencies and biases in the treatment of visual and 
audiovisual media, particularly comics and video games.  These problems show up 
both in First Amendment defenses and in copyright preemption analysis.  The 
possible arguments one might offer for treating images differently are insufficient 
to justify this disparity.  The Article concludes that, absent the distortion produced 
by images, the right of publicity would properly be understood as sharply limited. 
INTRODUCTION 
  “Celebrity,” John Updike wrote, “is a mask that eats into the face.”1  Just as 
Updike suggests celebrity changes and damages human beings, courts have allowed 
the right of publicity to etch itself into the First Amendment in their eagerness to 
reward celebrities for the power of their “images” and to prevent other people from 
exploiting those images.  The power of the visual image has allowed courts to 
create an inconsistent, overly expansive regime that would be easily understood as 
constitutionally unacceptable were the same rules applied to written words as are 
applied to drawings and video games.  The intersection of images with the right of 
publicity provides a lesson on how badly a misunderstood subject matter can distort 
 
 * Professor, Georgetown Law.  Thanks to Stacey Dogan, Mark Lemley, Mark McKenna, 
participants at the Works-in-Progress Intellectual Property (WIPIP) convention in 2012 (who heard a 
very early version of this paper) and my research assistants, Robert McCabe and Soojin Youn. 
 1. JOHN UPDIKE, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS:  MEMOIRS 252 (1989) (“Celebrity is a mask that eats 
into the face.  As soon as one is aware of being ‘somebody,’ to be watched and listened to with extra 
interest, input ceases, and the performer goes blind and deaf in his overanimation.  One can either see or 
be seen.”); cf. Yale Electric Corp. v. Robertson, 26 F. 972, 974 (2d Cir. 1928) (Hand, J.) (“[A] 
reputation, like a face, is the symbol of its possessor and creator, and another can use it only as a 
 mask.”). 
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the law, as well as on how important it is to provide a clear justification for 
intellectual property rights so that their proper boundaries may be determined. 
The trouble with images didn’t start with the right of publicity, which is a quasi-
property right granted by many states that developed out of the right of privacy.2  
Across fields of law, courts struggle with the regulation of images.3  The 
association between images and emotion complicates legal approaches that rely on 
ideas of rationality and interpretive approaches honed on text.4  As a result, courts 
often misjudge the meaning or functions of images.  At other times, courts simply 
treat images differently without providing any justification:  the image is so self-
evidently distinct from other forms of expression that to point out that something is 
an image is to explain why it can be regulated when equivalent text could not be. 
But images have caused extra damage when it comes to the right of publicity.  
Like images themselves, celebrities (and the fans who provide them with their 
economic value) have often been associated with emotion, excess, ungovernability 
and irrationality.5  Courts have regularly seemed disgusted with celebrity culture 
even while allocating economic rights to exploit such irrational preferences.  
Today, the right of publicity expansively grants celebrities the right to control 
commercial exploitations of their names, likenesses, voices and often enough their 
“identities” in any form that those identities are evoked.6  This right can be 
metaphorically shorthanded as a right to control “image,” indicating the way in 
which publicity rights are bound up with the heavily visual culture of the past 
century that gave us the modern celebrity.  This shorthand mirrors one of the key 
features of visual images:  they can seem to convey much more than visual 
information.  A person’s “image” is not just what she looks like, but also facts—or 
audiences’ beliefs—about her.  We may caution ourselves not to judge books by 
their covers, but we routinely do so.  Because the “image” is so rich in meaning, 
references to it may seem to be taking—even misappropriating—something very 
substantial, which justifies a celebrity’s claim to control. 
Unsurprisingly, the intersection of a nearly unbounded right with a category of 
objects that courts don’t handle well has led to some very bad decisions.  Currently, 
the lower courts are in disarray about how to treat the right of publicity, especially 
when it comes into conflict with First Amendment rights to create noncommercial 
expression, or with copyright law.  The pervasive entanglement of the right of 
 
 2. See generally 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY § 3:1 (2d 
ed. 2014). 
 3. See Elizabeth G. Porter, Taking Images Seriously, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), 
available at http://perma.cc/GM26-2AFZ; Rebecca Tushnet, Worth a Thousand Words:  The Images of 
Copyright Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 683 (2012). 
 4. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 689. 
 5. See Mark Bartholomew, A Right is Born:  Celebrity, Property, and Postmodern Lawmaking, 
44 CONN. L. REV. 301, 307, 331–32 (2011) (discussing the legal history of viewing celebrity as 
emotional, though ultimately also as valuable, as the locus of legal interest shifted from the irrational 
preferences of audiences to the manipulative and quantifying powers of experts to create and define 
celebrity value). 
 6. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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publicity with the regulation of images has made it more difficult to understand the 
appropriate scope of the right.  But if, as everyone seems to agree, the Constitution 
precludes requiring a celebrity’s consent before a writer can pen a biography of her, 
the result should be the same when a comic artist picks up a pencil or a 
programmer opens a file. 
Part I of this Article offers an abbreviated history of the right of publicity, 
focusing on its relation to the regulation of images and its escape from serious First 
Amendment scrutiny.  Parts II and III examine publicity cases involving visual art 
forms, mainly comic art and video games.  Part IV examines possible distinctions 
that might be offered to justify giving celebrities broader rights to control visual 
representations than other methods of evoking their identities.  Part V considers the 
relationship of these issues to copyright preemption, which operates to displace 
state-law causes of action that interfere with federal copyright policy.  I conclude 
that, to the extent a right of publicity is appropriate at all, it should not extend to 
noncommercial speech—even when that speech comes in the form of images 
instead of words.7 
I.  HISTORY 
A.  FROM PRIVACY TO PUBLICITY 
Before the right of publicity had a name as a separate right, courts and 
commentators wrote in terms of “privacy,” meaning a person’s control over the 
extent of dissemination of information—or really, when the relevant rights began to 
develop in earnest, dissemination of images.  Visual culture is a hallmark of 
modern Western life.  Images of ourselves and other people are crucial, often 
predominant, parts of the culture.8  Photography, and then moving pictures, became 
objects of public concern.  Professor Samantha Barbas notes that “new 
technologies of visual representation and the fragmented and unstable nature of 
interpersonal relations in the city generated new anxieties around image, identity, 
and self-presentation in public.”9  With mass media rising and traditional social ties 
declining, “appearances, first impressions and images became matters of great 
individual and collective significance.”10  The legal right to privacy developed in 
this context.11 
The new privacy right grew up alongside the increasing use of images in 
advertising.  Specifically, advertisers took advantage of new technologies in a 
“binge of image appropriation,”12 and they often didn’t bother to get the consent of 
 
 7. As explained below, common-law copyright might justify protecting entire unfixed 
performances, see supra note 192 and accompanying text, but that is such a small part of the modern 
right of publicity that I am omitting it for now. 
 8. Samantha Barbas, The Laws of Image, 47 NEW ENG. L. REV. 23 (2012). 
 9. Id. at 25–26. 
 10. Id. at 26. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 39 (citing Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:  Popular Culture and 
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photographic subjects when they purchased images from photographers.  The 
perceived intimacy of a photograph of a person’s face made this appropriation 
seem particularly outrageous.13  As the general public, as well as famous people, 
became more comfortable with commercializing such images, courts started to 
identify the harm of such uses less as insults to dignity and privacy and more as 
violations of a right to control and profit from any commercial uses.14  An image, 
described by the Supreme Court as a “short cut from mind to mind,”15 here became 
private property, not a public pathway. 
The right of publicity thus detached from the right of privacy and began its 
development as a separate, specifically commercial right of well-known people in 
the mid-twentieth century.  Eventually, its expansion would collide with the 
expansion of the First Amendment to protect entertainment as speech.  But unlike 
the centuries-old cause of action for defamation, which was cut down in numerous 
and vital ways by the rise of the First Amendment as a constraint on tort claims,16 
the right of publicity would fare far better in this collision.  Perhaps the right of 
publicity, which protects celebrities’ interest in getting paid when someone else 
refers to them, simply seems weightier to the modern mind than the classic dignity 
interest in maintaining a person’s good reputation.  Even if this calculation has not 
been made explicitly, that is the functional result of changes in doctrine over the 
years. 
B.  MODERN PUBLICITY RIGHTS AND NON-ADVERTISING SPEECH 
There is no federal right of publicity, and different states approach it somewhat 
differently.  New York, for example, has only a statutory right, and it is expressly 
limited to uses of a person’s name, picture, portrait or voice for advertising or 
purposes of trade; the courts have interpreted its scope narrowly.17  Unfortunately, 
many other states—including litigation and entertainment powerhouse 
California18—are not so limited, and define the right of publicity to include for-
 
Publicity Rights, 81 CALIF. L. REV. 125, 157–58 (1993)). 
 13. Id. at 40 (citing Robert E. Mensel, Kodakers Lying in Wait:  Amateur Photography and the 
Right of Privacy in New York, 1885-1915, 43 AM. Q. 24, 32 (1991)). 
 14. Barbas, supra note 8, at 65–66; Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 328–29. 
 15. W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943). 
 16. Defamation plaintiffs who are public officials or public figures are now required by the First 
Amendment to show both falsehood and malice—deliberate lying or reckless disregard of the truth.  See 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (public officials); Curtis Publ’g Co. v. 
Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (public figures).  Private persons involved in matters of public concern 
must prove, at a minimum, negligence to recover.  Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347–48 
(1974). 
 17. See N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW § 51 (McKinney 2014) (providing a cause of action when a 
person’s “name, portrait, picture or voice is used within this state for advertising purposes or for the 
purposes of trade” without the person’s written consent); Hoepker v. Kruger, 200 F. Supp. 2d 340, 348–
49 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (explaining that art, even for-profit art, is not within the scope of the New York 
right). 
 18. See Cal. Civ. Code § 3344(a) (statutory right of publicity protecting “name, voice, signature, 
photograph, or likeness” against uses “on or in products, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of 
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profit speech by artists if the speech “exploits” a person’s identity.19 
The right of publicity is easiest to defend as to unauthorized uses of a person’s 
identity in advertising, which often (though not always) raise risks of false 
endorsement.  Advertising is not, however, my primary concern.  Commercial 
speech is putatively afforded lower constitutional protections compared to 
noncommercial speech.  Moreover, at least in standard instances of false 
endorsement in advertising, the right of publicity overlaps with trademark law and 
furthers a similar interest in avoiding consumer deception.  Because of the lesser 
First Amendment rights and greater public interest at issue in deceptive advertising 
cases, I will focus on speech that is not advertising and would otherwise be 
categorized as noncommercial and fully protected under First Amendment 
doctrine.20 
Noncommercial speech has great significance for the right of publicity.  Despite 
the slow expansion of the right in other significant ways (such as survival upon the 
celebrity’s death),21 the right of publicity reached beyond pure advertising almost 
from the beginning.  Haelan Laboratories v. Topps Chewing Gum, a classic early 
case, found a violation of a baseball player’s right of publicity in the unauthorized 
use of his name and picture on baseball cards sold in packs with gum.22  In today’s 
language, this was a “promotional goods” case:  the product that buyers were 
seeking was, at least in part, precisely a representation of baseball players (and for 
many collectors, the gum was completely beside the point).23  Because this case 
 
advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, goods or services” (emphasis 
added)); Stewart v. Rolling Stone LLC, 105 Cal. Rptr. 3d 98, 111 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010) (identifying the 
elements of the common law claim as:  “(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the 
appropriation of plaintiff’s name or likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) 
lack of consent; and (4) resulting injury” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 19. The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition, followed by many states lacking clear 
precedent about the scope of common-law rights, also defines the right of publicity in this way.  See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 cmt. d (1995) (“The right of publicity protects 
the commercial value of a person’s identity.”) 
 20. See, e.g., Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952) (holding that 
“expression by means of motion pictures is included within the free speech and free press guaranty” in 
the Constitution, even though the production, distribution and exhibition of a film “is a large-scale 
business conducted for private profit”). 
 21. Bartholomew, supra note 5, at 309–15 (discussing the significant limits imposed on the right 
until the 1980s and 1990s); see also Barbas, supra note 8, at 25 (“Reputation, a mode of social 
evaluation historically associated with stable and enduring communities, is based on appraisals and 
judgments accrued over time.  Image, by contrast, is the representation of self that one constructs and 
presents in a world defined by mobility and relatively transient social relations: the fleeting contacts of 
the city, the momentary connections of the world wide web.” (footnote omitted)). 
 22. Haelan Labs. v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953); see also 1 MCCARTHY, 
supra note 2, § 1:26 (noting that Haelan was the first case to use the term “right of publicity”). 
 23. See William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, Games Are Not Coffee Mugs:  Games and the Right of 
Publicity, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 8–9 (2012) (“Judge Frank’s opinion 
actually described [Haelan] largely in terms of advertising, suggesting the court viewed baseball cards 
as secondary to the chewing gum, a dated view of baseball cards even in 1953.  Originally, baseball 
cards may have been a promotional gimmick to sell gum, but gum ceased to be the primary product long 
ago, maybe even before the Haelan decision.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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was decided before the First Amendment was understood to protect entertainment, 
even full narratives such as movies,24 it is not surprising that courts gave little 
thought to the advertising/non-advertising divide when confronted with mere 
baseball cards sold for profit.25 
Over time, the conflict between the right of publicity and the First Amendment 
should have become more sharply framed.  Still, the Supreme Court’s first 
encounter with the right resulted in a rout for the First Amendment.  In Zacchini v. 
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., a television station filmed and broadcast a trick 
performer’s entire act, and the Court held that, by reproducing—”appropriating”—
the entirety of his performance, the station had violated the right of publicity, even 
though this was noncommercial speech (that is, speech that was more than an 
advertisement proposing a commercial transaction).26  The First Amendment did 
not protect the station’s actions because the right of publicity served the goal of 
incentivizing such performances, similar to common-law copyright for unpublished 
works.27  This was the Court’s sole direct pronouncement on the right of publicity 
to date.  Apparently freed from First Amendment constraints, the right proceeded to 
expand far beyond protecting against the reproduction of entire performances.28 
Subsequent cases in lower courts found valid publicity rights claims in 
everything from a humorous reference to “Don’s Henley” in an ad for henley 
shirts,29 to the use of a blonde-wigged robot evoking Vanna White next to the 
Wheel of Fortune display in an ad for a videotape recorder.30  Now, the use of a 
celebrity’s “identity,” not just her exact name, image or voice, can in some states—
including California—lead to liability.  The key cases expanding the concept of 
“identity” involved advertising, but plaintiffs have also sued noncommercial 
 
 24. Burstyn, 343 U.S. 495 (rejecting Mut. Film Corp. v. Indus. Comm’n of Ohio, 236 U.S. 230 
(1915), which held that movies were not protected speech). 
 25. See Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 9 DEPAUL-
LCA J. ART. & ENT. L. 35, 56, 58–59 (1998) (explaining that the right of publicity arose when 
commercial speech, including entertainment speech, was deemed unworthy of First Amendment 
protection and that courts continued applying the old right of publicity rules without using modern First 
Amendment categories of protected speech). 
 26. Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980) (defining 
commercial speech as “expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its 
audience”).  Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 575–76 (1977), labeled the station’s 
speech as commercial because it was made for profit, but subsequent cases have clarified that non-
advertising speech made for profit is noncommercial for First Amendment purposes.  See, e.g., Bolger v. 
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 67 (1983) (holding that economic motivation for speech by 
itself does not make speech commercial). 
 27. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 (“[T]he protection [afforded by the right of publicity] provides an 
economic incentive for [the performer] to make the investment required to produce a performance of 
interest to the public.  This same consideration underlies the patent and copyright laws.”). 
 28. K.J. Greene, Right of Publicity, Identity, and Performance, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & 
HIGH TECH. L.J. 865, 881 (2012) (“What is rather striking about the modern right of publicity is how 
often performance has nothing to do with anything.”); Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who?  The Case for a 
Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 392 (1999). 
 29. Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999). 
 30. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992). 
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speakers, sometimes successfully.31  Unlike the television station in Zacchini, the 
defendants in these more recent cases did not copy entire performances.  Often, 
they instead created realistic representations of the plaintiffs.  Nonetheless, courts 
have applied Zacchini broadly to allow right of publicity claims against 
noncommercial speech, without asking whether the Court’s First Amendment 
reasoning was limited to cases in which an entire value-generating performance 
was copied. 
As the law has developed, creators who make realistic depictions of celebrities 
are protected if they work in textual media.32  Biographers win in the rare 
circumstances they’re dragged into court,33 as did the writer of a highly 
fictionalized account in which an archbishop plotted the assassination of the Soviet 
Premier.34  Indeed, in noncommercial speech cases, the mere use of biographical 
information in textual form often doesn’t even seem to count as “appropriation” of 
something of value.35  While “name” was included in the very first definitions of 
 
 31. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. b (1995) (“An 
unauthorized appropriation of another’s name or likeness for use on posters, buttons, or other 
memorabilia is . . . ordinarily actionable as an infringement of the right of publicity.”); see also Wendt v. 
Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806, 811–12 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that “Cheers”-themed bars that included 
robots simulating characters from the show could violate the right of publicity); Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro 
Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221 (2d Cir. 1978) (holding that a poster depicting Elvis Presley infringed the 
right of publicity); Winterland Concessions Co. v. Sileo, 528 F. Supp. 1201, 1214 (N.D. Ill. 1981) 
(holding that T-shirts depicting band logos violated the right of publicity), aff’d on other grounds, 735 
F.2d 257 (7th Cir. 1984); Martin Luther King, Jr., Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. Am. Heritage Prods., 
Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697 (Ga. 1982) (holding that sculptures of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. violated his right 
of publicity); see generally Jennifer E. Rothman, Commercial Speech, Commercial Use and the 
Intellectual Property Quagmire (Oct. 10, 2014) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with Columbia Journal 
of Law & the Arts). 
 32. See F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge:  The “Transformativeness” Test for 
Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to a Right of Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of 
Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 2, 6–7, 49 (2003) (noting divergent results in image and text cases, even 
when works all depict individuals without their consent). 
 33. See, e.g., Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that a publicity claim 
could not be based on biographical novel); Sidis v. F-R Publ’g Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940) 
(holding that New York’s statutory right of publicity did not cover either text or image constituting a 
biographical sketch of a former child prodigy); Hicks v. Casablanca Records, 464 F. Supp. 426 
(S.D.N.Y. 1978) (holding that New York’s statutory right of publicity did not cover a fictionalized 
account, in film and novel form, of true incident that occurred in the life of Agatha Christie); Frosch v. 
Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 427 N.Y.S.2d 828 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980) (same, for Marilyn Monroe’s name 
and images in biography); Rosemont Enters., Inc. v. Random House, Inc., 294 N.Y.S.2d 122 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 1968) (same, for Howard Hughes; primary focus was defamation, but the court also rejected a right 
of publicity claim).  Invasion of privacy and defamation remain potential claims in such text-focused 
cases, but those claims have their own First Amendment constraints and are much more difficult for 
plaintiffs to win, given that plaintiffs must show that the content of the challenged work offends 
important principles.  By contrast, the right of publicity applies regardless of the truth, falsity, 
offensiveness or inoffensiveness of the content.   
 34. Marcinkus v. NAL Publ’g, Inc., 522 N.Y.S.2d 1009, 1010 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1987); see also 
Matthews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432 (5th Cir. 1994) (fictionalized novel protected against right of 
publicity claim). 
 35. Matters are different in cases about classic advertising uses.  See, e.g., Abdul-Jabbar v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a right of publicity claim based on use of a name 
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what the right of publicity protects and still remains part of the standard list of 
protected attributes, it has lost pride of place to the image.36  For example, the 
Eleventh Circuit allowed a right of publicity claim (probably better understood as a 
right of privacy claim) based on the publication of photos of a murder victim, but 
not based on the text of the accompanying story reporting on her life history.37 
Ordinary citizens suing for misappropriation of their personal (non-image) data 
for private benefit have also generally failed, even when the relevant jurisdiction 
appears to authorize non-celebrity claims.38  The result in these commercial data 
mining cases is of particular note because in other cases, the right of publicity 
protects against free riding—that is, a defendant benefiting somehow from 
information about the plaintiff without consent or payment.  The harm to the 
plaintiff then stems from that lack of consent and payment.  Yet something about 
the dryness of the data (or its internal, invisible use) seems to make it less worthy 
of protection from free riding than images are.39 
In these cases, defendants who took only nonvisual information didn’t seem to 
interfere with an interest valuable enough to protect.  At the same time, because an 
image so often seems equivalent to the person being represented—as if the depicted 
person is herself transported to appear before the viewer—courts can easily 
understand images as less valuable for free speech purposes than other forms of 
communication, because they provide less information (even though the objection 
 
in a conventional advertisement); Henley v. Dillard Dep’t Stores, 46 F. Supp. 2d 587, 587–88 (N.D. 
Tex. 1999) (same). 
 36. Names are not completely defunct as subjects of litigation.  See Ross v. Roberts, 166 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013) (rejecting right of publicity claim by notorious drug dealer Rick Ross 
against rapper who adopted the name Rick Ross and rapped as if he were a notorious drug dealer).  
Recently, the licensor of James Dean’s right of publicity sued Twitter for refusing to suspend the 
@JamesDean username, which mainly posts observations about and by deceased actor James Dean, 
using the third person to describe him.  See James Dean, Inc. v. Twitter, Inc., No. 29D01-1213-CC, 2013 
WL 7172609, at *8–9, *19–34 (Ind. Super. Ct. Dec. 31, 2013), notice of removal filed, No. 14-cv-
00183, 2014 WL 540380 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2014).  Twitter’s impersonation policy bans deceptive 
impersonation, but not parody, fan accounts or otherwise unbelievable attributions.  See Impersonation 
Policy, TWITTER, http://perma.cc/A7NB-HXQD?type=source (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).  Since the 
@JamesDean account is not commercial, only an extremely expansive right to control references to a 
celebrity could give the licensor a legal remedy.  The Twitter account is presently suspended, though 
Twitter has made no public statement about the litigation.  It might also be worth noting that some 
countries, such as France and Germany, protect name and likeness separately, though protection may 
overlap.  See Mary LaFrance & Gail H. Cline, Identical Cousins:  On the Road with Dilution and the 
Right of Publicity, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 641, 659 & nn.101, 104–05 (2008). 
 37. Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 38. See, e.g., Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (names, addresses 
and spending information used for commercial purposes were not “appropriated” because the 
information had no value to plaintiffs, despite its commercial value to defendants).  
 39. Cf. Christoff v. Nestle USA, Inc., 213 P.3d 132 (Cal. 2009) (right of publicity claim of a 
former model for use of his image on the label for Taster’s Choice instant coffee; statute of limitations 
was the only barrier to recovery); Cohen v. Herbal Concepts, Inc., 473 N.Y.S.2d 426 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1984) (finding that “portrait or picture” in state privacy law covered “any representation,” not just faces, 
and thus a picture featuring back of nude woman was actionable if friends and family could identify her 
from the image). 
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to use of images is usually that they show too much).40  In one case, for example, a 
magistrate judge concluded that sales of a news photo could constitute 
misappropriation when placed alone on T-shirts or mugs:  A picture with 
accompanying explanatory text “alongside an undisputedly legitimate news article” 
sold for profit would be fully protected news under the First Amendment, whereas 
a picture sold “unaccompanied by any information” regarding the contents might 
“cross[] the line from the mere ‘giving of information’ to a ‘sensational prying into 
private lives for its own sake.’”41  But if the picture adds anything to the text (and 
thus deserves First Amendment protection as part of the story), the incremental 
information that it adds must in some way be newsworthy.42  Giving a full account 
of an event has never been a requirement for First Amendment protection, absent 
defamation.  Nonetheless, the court required pictures to be accompanied by words 
in order to be newsworthy. 
Although the case law establishes special protections for nonvisual uses, not all 
noncommercial, nontextual speech yields to the right of publicity.  Defendants who 
produce conventional narratives, including movies, do reasonably well.  Courts 
now find it easy to understand that both books and films are at the core of the First 
Amendment’s protection for speech, even if they are fictional.43  The fact that 
books often contain photos hasn’t been a barrier to their protection, even though the 
same photos sold alone could well be found to violate the right of publicity44—the 
image, it seems, is protected if it is sufficiently explained. 
However, realism in other media, particularly pictures and video games (the 
narratives of which do not resemble conventional sequential narratives and are 
often discounted by courts focusing on their visual aspects), remains risky for 
creators.  And the law is shaky enough to be worth litigating for nonfiction films:  
 
 40. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 707–08. 
 41. Peckham v. New England Newspapers, Inc., 865 F. Supp. 2d 127 (D. Mass. 2012) (Neiman, 
J.). 
 42. Cf. Campbell v. MGN Ltd., [2004] UKHL 22, [2004] 2 A.C. 457 (H.L.) at [72] (Lord 
Hoffman) (arguing that “a photograph is in principle information no different from any other 
information” in a case involving photos of the supermodel Naomi Campbell). 
 43. See, e.g., Tyne v. Time Warner Entm’t Co., 901 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 2005) (holding that Florida’s 
right of publicity did not apply to a movie—a fictionalized account of a fishing boat lost in a storm—
that did not directly promote any other product or service).  Even when the “narrative” is extremely 
limited, live-action video generally escapes right of publicity controls.  See, e.g., Lane v. MRA 
Holdings, LLC, 242 F. Supp. 2d 1205 (M.D. Fla. 2002) (rejecting claim against the “Girls Gone Wild” 
series, which offers videos of inebriated young women, because use of image in video and on video 
cover was not for “commercial” purpose). 
 44. See also Titan Sports, Inc. v. Comics World Corp., 870 F.2d 85 (2d Cir. 1989) (finding that a 
publisher could be liable for distributing “magazines” if they were actually sold in order to distribute 
posters of wrestlers); Mendonsa v. Time, Inc., 678 F. Supp. 967 (D.R.I. 1988) (finding that the plaintiff, 
who was allegedly the sailor in the famous Alfred Eisenstadt photograph of a sailor kissing a woman in 
Times Square on V-J Day, stated a valid right of publicity claim against Life magazine for offering 
limited edition prints of the photo); cf. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 
(Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding that a newspaper did not violate the right of publicity by selling “posters” 
that were replicas of entire newspaper pages, including but not limited to prominent images of football 
star Joe Montana). 
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Recent cases allege that the NFL violated players’ rights of publicity by including 
footage of them in historical films.  The NFL settled some of these claims and then 
won summary judgment on its First Amendment defense against the players who 
opted out of the settlement, but no court of appeals has yet spoken on the matter.45  
A California federal district court recently ruled that college football players have a 
right of publicity interest in being compensated for television broadcasts of 
games.46  Written works, meanwhile, have been left in a uniquely privileged 
position.  As I will argue in the next two Parts, the presence of images causes 
courts to be willing to break the commercial/noncommercial barrier and condemn 
non-advertising speech as infringing. 
II.  COMIC SANS CONSISTENCY 
Part I’s abbreviated history explains that the right of publicity is large and 
potentially invasive of artistic and creative speech.  This Part explores several key 
right of publicity cases involving comic art.  Because courts have refused to draw a 
line between commercial and noncommercial speech, they instead developed First 
Amendment defenses for art that only protect certain kinds of creativity and 
stylistic choices. 
Difficulties in the legal treatment of comics may be unsurprising, because some 
theorists maintain that comics are uniquely difficult to interpret, at least in the 
words that are courts’ stock-in-trade.47  Comic art’s legal troubles are related to the 
ways in which it crosses boundaries and is therefore culturally devalued.48  
 
 45. See Dryer v. Nat’l Football League, No. 09-2182, 2014 WL 5106738 (D. Minn. Oct. 10, 
2014); Culp v. NFL Prods. LLC, No. 13-7815 (NLH/JS), 2014 WL 4828189, at *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 29, 
2014). 
 46. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., No. C 09-1967, 2014 
WL 1410451 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2014), at *7–11 (holding that athletes’ right of publicity extended to 
full broadcasts of their games and reserving judgment on its extension to clips and highlight footage in 
some commercial speech), aff’d on other grounds, 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 2013); accord O’Bannon v. 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, No. C 09-03329, 2014 WL 3899815, at *25 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 8, 2014) 
(reaffirming the court’s rejection of the NCAA’s claim that “the First Amendment and certain state laws 
preclude student-athletes from asserting any rights of publicity in the use of their names, images, and 
likenesses during live game telecasts”). 
 47. See, e.g., SCOTT MCCLOUD, UNDERSTANDING COMICS:  THE INVISIBLE ART (Mark Martin 
ed., HarperPerennial 1994) (arguing that comics’ combination of words and images requires unique 
analysis); Greg M. Smith, Surveying the World of Contemporary Comics Scholarship:  A Conversation, 
50 CINEMA J. 135, 141 (2011) (statement of Scott Bukatman, Professor of Film & Media Studies, 
Stanford Univ.) (“Greg asks whether there’s something about comics that makes them particularly 
difficult to analyze, and I’d answer yes, without being entirely sure of what the problem is. Comics are 
indeed difficult to paraphrase, much more so than film.  I can describe a shot in loving, evocative 
language far more easily than I can a comics sequence (‘Then the next panel on the bottom tier is taller 
to show how the body is moving . . .’ []).”); see also Marc H. Greenberg, Comics, Courts & 
Controversy:  A Case Study of the Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, 32 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 121, 
143, 157 (2012) (discussing various decisions that fail to come to grips with the merger of words and art 
in comics and that treat comic art as less worthy and meaningful than words). 
 48. See, e.g., JARED GARDNER, PROJECTIONS:  COMICS AND THE HISTORY OF TWENTY-FIRST-
CENTURY STORYTELLING ix (2012) (“[A] series of critical misconceptions and misunderstandings . . . 
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“Comics aren’t novels, so they aren’t understood as high status and inherently 
meaningful.  They aren’t pure visual art, so they don’t enjoy the insulation of the 
transcendent power of nonverbal art.  They are mixed, not purebred, and they get 
treated as such.”49  Over a hundred years after the art form became widespread, 
comics still generate unease and misunderstanding.  The peak of anti-comic moral 
panic has passed,50 but when legal battles do occur, courts struggle with the 
hybridity and liminality of comic art. 
Within right of publicity law specifically, courts have treated comics as less 
valuable than other kinds of art.  For example, Doe v. TCI found that a comic book, 
Spawn, violated a hockey player’s right of publicity because a minor character, a 
mob enforcer, bore the same name as the hockey player (Tony Twist), and the 
creator admitted that—as a hockey fan—he had used Twist’s name and had even 
promoted the comic at hockey-related events.51  In deciding that the comic artist 
had no free speech defense, the Missouri Supreme Court ruled that, “[i]f a product 
is being sold that predominantly exploits the commercial value of an individual’s 
identity, that product should be held to violate the right of publicity and not be 
protected by the First Amendment.”52  Remarkably, the court found that the entire 
comic book Spawn was predominantly an exploitation of Tony Twist (the hockey 
player), even though Tony Twist (the character) was a minor character in a story 
about an undead superhero who had been released from Hell.53  The court therefore 
upheld a damages award that ultimately reached $15 million.54 
 
 
have only served to compound the error of the name [comics]:  that they are directed primarily at 
juvenile audiences; that they are easy or transparent reading; that they are, if not beneath contempt, 
certainly not worth notice from those whose job it is to determine what is, indeed, worthy of notice.”); 
MARC H. GREENBERG, COMIC ART, CREATIVITY AND THE LAW 13 (2014) (“Creators in the comic art 
genre have often encountered . . . cultural bias about the blended nature (graphic art and text) found in 
many comic works. . . . [A] number of legal doctrines . . . have failed to recognize that comics are 
literary works . . . . Rather, comic art, particularly in the United States, has been characterized as ‘low 
art’.” (footnote omitted)). 
 49. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 741 (footnote omitted); see also Gardner, supra note 48, at xi (“As a 
form that works with traditionally incommensurate systems of meaning—text and image—to tell its 
story, [comic art] also requires its readers at every turn to make active decisions as to how to read the 
two in relationship to a larger narrative.”). 
 50. In 1948, for example, a Los Angeles county ordinance made it a misdemeanor to sell or give 
anyone under eighteen a publication that depicted “an account of crime . . . through the use of drawings 
or photographs”; similar bans were widespread and widely applied against comics.  BRADFORD W. 
WRIGHT, COMIC BOOK NATION:  THE TRANSFORMATION OF YOUTH CULTURE IN AMERICA 98–99 (rev. 
ed. 2003). 
 51. Doe v. TCI Cablevision, 110 S.W.3d 363, 371–72 (Mo. 2003) (en banc). 
 52. Id. at 374, citing Mark S. Lee, Agents of Chaos:  Judicial Confusion in Defining the Right of 
Publicity – Free Speech Interface, 23 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 471, 488–98 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 53. The Missouri Supreme Court was evidently affected by the fact that the comic was promoted 
at hockey events—but the comic as a whole was still what was at issue; the award upheld was not for 
those promotions but for the comic itself. 
 54. See Doe v. McFarlane, 207 S.W.3d 52 (Mo. Ct. App. 2006) (affirming revised award).   
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In order to reach the conclusion that Spawn predominantly exploited Tony 
Twist, the Missouri Supreme Court implicitly defined a subset of Spawn (the part 
featuring Tony Twist) as the product, and then held that the non-exploitative parts 
were less important than the exploitative parts.  Yet the court referred neither to the 
plot of Spawn nor to its visuals, neither of which bear any relationship to Tony 
Twist the hockey player—an example of considering images worthless, which here 
had the effect of stripping First Amendment protection from a primarily visual 
medium even without the use of an image of the plaintiff.  The court ignored the 
comics themselves except as commercial products, as if they were full of 
cornflakes instead of art.56  This assessment was undoubtedly assisted by the 
culturally liminal status of comic books—kid stuff, not worthy of dignity, not as 
important as “real” books.  Even though the character’s name was the source of 
liability, it is impossible to imagine a similar victory against a novel with a minor 
character named Tony Twist:57  the prominence of the images devalued the 
artwork, then dropped out of the analysis. 
There is also a directly contradictory comics case decided under California law, 
Winter v. DC Comics.  Winter held that the characters of the Autumn brothers, a 
pair of evil albino twins named Johnny and Edgar, did not infringe the publicity 
 
 55. TODD MCFARLANE, SPAWN #47 (Apr. 1, 1996). 
 56. Right of publicity law generally struggles to distinguish that which is protected speech from 
that which is unprotected merchandising, but it is notable that the unprotected “merchandise”—like 
posters, mugs, magnets and so on—are media that are particularly likely to feature images, either as 
their most prominent feature or without any accompanying words at all. 
 57. Cf. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the use of the movie title 
FRED AND GINGER to refer to the two main characters, who were not Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers 
but used their names as nicknames, was not a violation of right of publicity or trademark law because of 
the filmmaker’s expressive interest in using the name).  Several movies and television shows feature 
characters who share the names of famous people.  See, e.g., A FISH CALLED WANDA (Prominent 
Features 1988) (character named Archie Leach, better known as Cary Grant); COOL RUNNINGS (Walt 
Disney Pictures 1993) (character named Yul Brenner); OFFICE SPACE (20th Century Fox 1999) (Michael 
Bolton); SHORTBUS (Fortissimo Films 2006) (character named Jennifer Aniston); Due South (CTV 
television series 1994–99) (character named Maggie Thatcher); Grace Under Fire (ABC television 
series 1993–98) (character named Grace Kelly, with relatives named Jean Kelly and Emmet Kelly, 
among others); Twin Peaks (ABC television series 1990–91) (character named Harry S. Truman).  
Books, as well, feature similar characters, such as, John Connolly’s supernatural detective series Charlie 
Parker (named for the title character), Mary Janice Davidson’s Undead and Unwed series (character 
named Elizabeth Taylor), Bill Fitzhugh’s Pest Control (character named Bob Dillon), Tao Lin’s, 
Richard Yates (characters named Dakota Fanning and Haley Joel Osment) and C. E. Murphy’s Walker 
Papers series (character named Billy Holiday). 
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rights of the Winter brothers, a pair of albino twins with a singing career and with 
the same first names as the Autumn brothers.58 
 
59  60 
 
Some further background is necessary to understand what happened in Winter, 
in which the court used a variant of the transformativeness test adapted from 
copyright’s fair use test.  Transformativeness, according to this approach, protects 
creative works when their (market) value comes from the creativity added by the 
artist and not from the celebrity’s identity.  The California Supreme Court first 
announced its transformativeness test in Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary 
Saderup, Inc. as a way to protect artists’ First Amendment interests while allowing 
celebrities to control things like T-shirts and posters that featured their images.61  
Thus, in Comedy III, the court found that an artist infringed the Three Stooges’ 
right of publicity by creating standard charcoal portraits and selling prints and T-
shirts reproducing those portraits.62 
 
 58. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473, 479 (Cal. 2003). 
 59. EDGAR WINTER & JOHNNY WINTER, TOGETHER:  EDGAR WINTER AND JOHNNY WINTER LIVE 
(Blue Sky 1976). 
 60. JOE R. LANSDALE, TIMOTHY TRUMAN & SAM GLANZMAN, JONAH HEX:  RIDERS OF THE 
WORM & SUCH #4 (June 1, 1995).  Along with their shared albinism, “Johnny Autumn wears a black 
stovepipe hat—a hat similar to one that Johnny Winter often wore at rock shows when he performed.”  
Greenberg, supra note 48, at 77. 
 61. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 808–10 (Cal. 2001). 
 62. Id. at 811. 
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63 
Comedy III recognized that its transformativeness standard apparently posed 
risks to a number of artistic works, but announced that other depictions would still 
be protected by the First Amendment.  For example, Andy Warhol’s silkscreens, 
despite not obviously differing in their formal characteristics from Saderup’s 
drawings, were transformative; this is essentially because Warhol was famous and 
therefore the art world reacted as if the silkscreens commented on the celebrities 
depicted, reactions the court attributed to Warhol’s “distortion” and “careful 
manipulation of context.”64 
As the court’s blessing of Warhol indicates, using transformativeness to draw 
the line between protected and unprotected artistic works creates significant 
problems.65  The choice of Warhol as a representative non-infringing artist is at 
best ironic, given Warhol’s lack of involvement in many of “his” artworks and his 
explicit rejection of a line between art and commerce.66  But the California 
 
 63. Id. at 812. 
 64. Comedy III 21 P.3d. at 811.  
 65. See Bruce P. Keller & Rebecca Tushnet, Even More Parodic Than the Real Thing:  Parody 
Lawsuits Revisited, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 979, 1014 (2004) (“Even accepting the idea that Warhol’s 
cachet added value to his lithographs beyond the celebrity image portrayed, it is manifest that Saderup’s 
cachet, though more limited, did so as well. . . . Under Saderup, traditional portraitists, photographers 
and likely the unknown Warhols and Lichtensteins of the next generation will be barred from using 
images free to looser hands.” (footnote omitted)); cf. David Tan, What Do Judges Know About 
Contemporary Art?:  Richard Prince and Reimagining the Fair Use Test in Copyright Law, 16 MEDIA 
& ARTS L. REV. 381 (2011) (“From the US state district courts all the way to the Supreme Court, judges 
are struggling to agree on what is worth protecting, but there seems to be an eerie unanimity that Andy 
Warhol’s multiple silkscreen renditions that appropriate the image of Marilyn Monroe is the 
paradigmatic example of transformation in contemporary art that would qualify as fair use in copyright 
law.”). 
 66. See ANDY WARHOL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF ANDY WARHOL 92 (1975) (“Being good in 
business is the most fascinating kind of art.”); Gareth S. Lacy, Standardizing Warhol:  Antitrust Liability 
for Denying the Authenticity of Artwork, 6 WASH. J.L. TECH. & ARTS 185, 186–87 (2011) (“In 1962, 
Andy Warhol began mass-producing silkscreened prints of Coke bottles, soup cans, and movie stars.  
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Supreme Court reacted to Warhol’s reputation, not to the content of his work or its 
conditions of production.  The transformation the court saw in Warhol’s work, but 
not in Saderup’s mere craftsmanship, demonstrates that “visual perception depends 
not only on what something looks like, but also on what it means.”67  
Transformativeness thus forces judges to become art critics and evaluate whose 
message matters.68 
This problem can be further illustrated by an example from renowned comics 
artist Brian Michael Bendis.  Bendis created a portrait of Woody Allen, who has 
litigated and won some significant right of publicity cases.69  This is a standard 
portrait, done in charcoal, that seems therefore to fall right within the Comedy III 
boundaries for what violates the right of publicity in California. 
 
 
Warhol produced this art in his studio, known as The Factory, in much the same way corporations mass-
produced consumer goods.  The line between business and art soon blurred for Warhol:  ‘Business art is 
the step that comes after Art.  I started as a commercial artist, and I want to finish as a business artist.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
 67. Gary Lupyan & Michael J. Spivey, Perceptual Processing Is Facilitated by Ascribing 
Meaning to Novel Stimuli, 18 CURRENT BIOLOGY R410, R412 (2008). 
 68. Perceptions of what has been added to images are highly manipulable by context—a context 
that lawyers are happy to provide once litigation begins, adding to the problems of predictability and 
overreach.  See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 733–38 (discussing “verbal overshadowing,” in which verbal 
descriptions affect visual perception). 
 69. Allen v. Men’s World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360, 362, 371 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (enjoining a 
look-alike’s misappropriation of Woody Allen’s persona); Allen v. Nat’l Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 
630 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (granting an injunction against a Woody Allen look-alike in a commercial); see 
also Complaint, Allen v. Am. Apparel, Inc., No. 08 CV 3179, 2008 U.S. Dist. Ct. Pleadings LEXIS 
9085 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2008); Christopher Palmeri, American Apparel Settles with Woody Allen, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (May 18, 2009), http://perma.cc/C763-AFCK (discussing the settlement of 
a claim based on two billboards featuring a photograph of Woody Allen). 
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The caption reads, “These portraits were something I did for myself; I do them 
when I am studying the artist’s work.  Hard to explain how it helps me understand 
them, but it does.”  Bendis makes a particular artistic claim:  drawing Allen helps 
him understand Allen’s art.70  Is this transformative, adding value beyond that of 
Allen’s own celebrity identity?  If a court were to defer to this argument, it would 
have done so only because Bendis has used words to explain his visual art,71 and 
because a court proved willing to accept those words.  Unlike copyright cases, 
where artists regularly get the chance to provide interpretations of their images, 
right of publicity cases demand that transformativeness be visually perceptible by 
judges, who are often not the audience to whom the relevant works are directed.72 
More generally, transformativeness is structurally biased in favor of text.  A 
novel or nonfiction work about Marilyn Monroe that does not caricature her, but 
 
 70. BRIAN MICHAEL BENDIS, TOTAL SELL-OUT (2003). 
 71. Compare Blanch v. Koons, 396 F. Supp. 2d 476, 480–81 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), aff’d, 467 F.3d 244 
(2d Cir. 2006), in which Jeff Koons’ testimony about the reasons he copied a fashion photograph 
explained transformativeness to the court in ways not obvious from the face of his painting.  See 
Rebecca Tushnet, Judges as Bad Reviewers:  Fair Use and Epistemological Humility, 25 LAW & LIT. 
20, 22 (2013). 
 72. The benefit of relying on intentionalism—the meaning of works as explained by the artists 
themselves—is contestable, especially as the sole legitimate interpretive method.  See, e.g., Monika Isia 
Jasiewicza, “A Dangerous Undertaking”:  The Problem of Intentionalism and Promise of Expert 
Testimony in Appropriation Art Infringement Cases, 26 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 143 (2014); Zahr Said, 
Reforming Copyright Interpretation (July 26, 2014) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://perma.cc/6MPL-43NZ.  But right of publicity cases have yet to recognize that there are even 
interpretive choices to be made, and the easy “readability” or transparency of images likely contributes 
to that gap. 
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that seeks to represent her realistically, will still seem to many observers to involve 
more contribution by the artist than a picture of her, because the skill and creativity 
required for a visual artist to represent reality will be transparent—invisible as 
creative output—both to courts and to audiences, whereas the skill and creativity 
involved in writing a narrative will be obvious to them.  Thus, the Comedy III test 
asks “whether the celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an 
original work is synthesized, or whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity 
is the very sum and substance of the work in question.”73  The California Supreme 
Court condemned “literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, 
directly trespassing on the right of publicity without adding significant expression 
beyond that trespass,”74 but did not notice that its use of “literal” really meant 
“visual.” 
The Comedy III court was clear that artistic talent in the visual realm, if aimed at 
producing a realistic depiction, ought to be ignored in the transformativeness 
inquiry:  “We ask . . . whether a product containing a celebrity’s likeness is so 
transformed that it has become primarily the defendant’s own expression rather 
than the celebrity’s likeness.  And when we use the word ‘expression,’ we mean 
expression of something other than the likeness of the celebrity.”75  A 
“conventional portrait of a celebrity” is not protected against a right of publicity 
claim,76 even though a “conventional” biography, reflecting reality in words, would 
plainly be protected by the First Amendment. 
Here, concepts of realism play important roles:  the word-portrait, however 
realistic in a literary sense, lacks direct correspondence to the celebrity, whereas the 
image’s transparency is more readily understood to mean that the image is nothing 
more than the celebrity.  In essence, a realistic visual representation will be treated 
as just a copy of the celebrity presence itself—a kind of totem—whereas a verbal 
representation will never be conflated with the thing it represents.  The Comedy III 
court implicitly denied the message of René Magritte’s famous painting, The 
Treachery of Images, in which a depiction of a pipe bears the caption, “This is not a 
pipe.”  The court did not explain why some modes of realism should be more 
favored by the law than others, especially if both require the addition of creative 
“labor.” 
Courts’ inability to see visual realism as an artistic choice leads them to conflate 
a representation with the thing represented.77  This collapse between representation 
 
 73. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001). 
 74. Id. at 808. 
 75. Id. at 809. 
 76. Id. at 810; see also id. at 811 (finding that “literal, conventional depictions of the Three 
Stooges,” drawn in charcoal, make “no significant transformative or creative contribution”); Estate of 
Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (“[E]ntertainment that is merely a copy or imitation, 
even if skillfully and accurately carried out, does not really have its own creative component and does 
not have a significant value as pure entertainment.”).  
 77. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 728 (discussing different concepts of realism); id. at 705 (“If 
you still doubt the power of the ‘magical relation between a picture and what it represents,’ try this 
experiment:  take a picture of your mother and cut out the eyes.  Images feel as if they have a mystic 
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and reality in images picks up on a problem that also arises with copyright’s fair 
use doctrine, from which Comedy III drew its transformativeness test:  to depict an 
image, one must depict the image.78  There is no conventionally understood way to 
paraphrase an image, because to the extent that images are understood to share an 
external referent (such as a celebrity), they are the same.  In ETW Corp. v. Jireh 
Publishing, Inc., the court rejected a trademark claim by Tiger Woods against the 
creator of a painting depicting him as a hero of golf.79  The majority held that 
Woods’ own person was outside the scope of trademark law to the extent that 
Woods claimed to own a trademark in any image of himself, however angled or 
posed.80  However, the court could not reject the right of publicity claim on the 
same grounds, because that right does cover every image.  All pictures of Tiger 
Woods are pictures of him and all pictures of the Three Stooges are pictures of 
them, even if they are posed in various ways.  Comedy III itself involved a drawing 
that apparently had no precise photographic reference and that indeed somewhat 
heroicized the Stooges compared to the ways in which they were usually 
photographed, but the court still found against the artist because of the recognizable 
referent. 
The difference between the expressive works protected by copyright and the 
personal identities protected by the right of publicity may help explain why the 
concept of transformativeness has been so flattened and misused in the latter body 
of law, while it has helped copyright fair use expand and accommodate many new, 
beneficial uses.  In copyright cases, courts regularly identify transformation in 
meaning and purpose, not transformation in physical or visual presentation.81  In 
right of publicity cases, however, there is no specific work that has allegedly been 
infringed.  Instead, courts have focused only on visual presentation or have made 
the wrong kinds of comparisons.82  Taking the copyright approach seriously would 
lead to very different outcomes:  a creative work might well have the purpose 
“represent the celebrity,” but that will always be a different purpose than “be the 
celebrity,” which is the function of the celebrity’s identity, even if both have 
 
connection to the reality they represent, inducing in us the feeling that they will operate to cause harm at 
a distance.” (footnotes omitted)).  Historically, our lore may have suggested that names have power; 
now, though, it is the face that matters. 
 78. See, e.g., Bill Graham Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605, 613 (2d Cir. 2006) 
(recognizing this necessity in the context of copyright fair use). 
 79. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc. 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).  
 80. Id. at 938. 
 81. E.g., Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 97 (2d Cir. 2014); R. Anthony Reese, 
Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 467 (2008). 
 82. For example, Estate of Fuller v. Maxfield & Oberton Holdings, LLC, 906 F. Supp. 2d 997 
(N.D.Cal. 2012), rejected a First Amendment defense by the manufacturer of toys called “Buckyballs.”  
The toys were so named because they could be manipulated to resemble a molecule commonly known 
as a “buckyball,” named for Buckminster Fuller.  Id. at 1002.  The Fuller court held that 
transformativeness depended on the visual nature of the transformation, and that use of a name is not an 
act of expression the way creation or alteration of an image is.  Id. at 1006.  A name, it reasoned, can’t 
be transformed while remaining recognizable, as an image can.  Id. (Many a young victim of schoolyard 
taunting based on an unfortunately suggestive name might disagree with the factual premise). 
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monetary value.83 
In right of publicity cases comparing a celebrity identity to a work of art, the 
conceptual collapse between representation and reality has thus prevented coherent 
analysis of transformativeness.  This slippage between the visual signifier and the 
signified in legal and non-legal thinking is fairly common,84 but presents serious 
difficulties when First Amendment rights are implicated, not least because the First 
Amendment covers speech (representation of a celebrity) but not conduct (being a 
celebrity). 
Where this identity between representation and reality breaks down, the law’s 
treatment is also revealing.  Courts will occasionally find enough distance from 
realism to identify visual transformativeness.85  Returning to Winter, the post-
Comedy III case in which the California Supreme Court easily found 
transformativeness, the court emphasized how different the comic’s fantastic 
setting and the Autumn brothers’ monstrous heritage was from the actual lives of 
musical performers Johnny and Edgar Winter.86  Likewise, the Tenth Circuit found 
that caricatures of baseball players did not infringe the right of publicity because 
they commented critically on the baseball players they mocked.87  Caricature 
distorts—exaggerates for critical effect—and thus is transformative. 
When the Ninth Circuit held that a greeting card making fun of Paris Hilton 
created a factual issue of infringement,88 it may therefore have been significant that 
 
 83. Of course, many celebrity identities are constructed, and celebrities are often performing 
particular versions of themselves.  Whether those versions are “inauthentic” in some sense is irrelevant 
to this analysis, because even a performance of a constructed self is different from a representation of 
some other entity in the world, and thus would have a different “purpose” if courts truly used 
copyright’s transformativeness test.  Mark McKenna suggested to me that a real transformation of the 
celebrity’s identity—the appropriate referent if there’s no specific work at issue, as there is in a 
copyright case—would preclude a violation of the right of publicity in the first place, since a celebrity 
identity transformed would no longer be the celebrity.  But since the right has expanded far enough to 
equate a robot in a blonde wig with Vanna White, see White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 971 F.2d 
1395 (9th Cir. 1992), I’m not sure that formulation works. 
 84. See, e.g., Dessa, Camera Obscura, in SPIRAL BOUND 59, 63–64 (2009) (“[O]nly the most 
recent generations have been confronted with images—still and moving—of their dead.  These images 
invest the dead with just as much vivacity as we possess ourselves.  There is Valentino lighting his 
cigarette, tapping it twice against the case.  There he is bare-chested, in a rage.  And there is smirking 
Valentino preparing to seduce the dancing girl—all the while completely unaware that he is dead . . . . 
[P]eople with muscular forearms, people with tans, people who can arch one eyebrow in perfect 
isolation, people with really good comic timing, these are individuals with appetite.  These are real 
people, like me and my friends.”). 
 85. Winter v. DC Comics, 69 P.3d 473 (Cal. 2003).  
 86. Id. at 479. 
 87. Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
 88. Hilton v. Hallmark Cards, 599 F.3d 894, 910 (9th Cir. 2010) (“[I]t is clear that merely 
merchandising a celebrity’s image without that person’s consent, the prevention of which is the core of 
the right of publicity, does not amount to a transformative use.”); see also No Doubt v. Activision 
Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011) (holding that it was not transformative to place 
visually accurate representations of members of a band in impossible physical locations or to have those 
representations perform songs the real band members would never perform, because the game avatars 
“remain at all times immutable images of the real celebrity musicians” and were “exact depictions of No 
Doubt’s members doing exactly what they do as celebrities”; distinguishing a previous case in which a 
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the card used a photo rather than a drawing to show her face, while the rest of the 





What emerges from the case law is not inconsistency.  It is bias against the 
visual.  Others have rightly criticized the Comedy III court for overemphasizing 
visible changes at the expense of changes in meaning and context, which should 
also be considered transformative.90  But it turns out that visible changes aren’t 
even necessary—instead, the absence of a realistic visual representation in a 
defendant’s creative work seems to be the most important feature of 
transformativeness and thus First Amendment protection (a pattern that continues 
in the video game cases discussed in the next Part).91  For example, one court was 
perfectly content to find transformativeness in the output of a rapper performing as 
Rick Ross, who copied the persona of actual convicted drug dealer Rick Ross.92  
The music was analogous to a fictional work with a protagonist resembling the 
 
video game character’s “physique, primary hairstyle and costumes, and dance moves” differed from the 
plaintiff’s and thus the character was found to be transformative). 
 89. See Paris Hilton Sues Over Hallmark Card, THE SMOKING GUN (Sept. 7, 2007), 
http://perma.cc/Z2TY-5266.  
 90. See, e.g., Dougherty, supra note 32, at 46–47 (criticizing Comedy III’s discrimination against 
realism); David Tan, Political Recoding of the Contemporary Celebrity and the First Amendment, 2 
HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1, 27 (2011) (criticizing Comedy III’s apparent focus on the visual and lack 
of clarity on the roles of context and meaning). 
 91. See also C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P., 505 
F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007); cf. Toffoloni v. LFP Publ’g Grp., LLC, 572 F.3d 1201 (11th Cir. 2009) 
(upholding publicity claim based on photos but not text of story about subject); MPS Entm’t, LLC v. 
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc., No. 11-24110-CIV, 2013 WL 3288039 (S.D. Fla. June 28, 2013) 
(finding no right of publicity claim where press release used subject’s name but not his photograph). 
 92. Ross v. Roberts, 166 Cal. Rptr. 3d 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 2013). 
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original Rick Ross; the rapper had created a “larger story” that made his music and 
persona “much more than literal depictions of the real Rick Ross.”93 
A focus on visual change risks holding realistic images infringing even when 
they are incorporated into political or cultural commentary—for example, a 
political advertisement featuring Lindsay Lohan’s mug shot as part of an argument 




In what sense does this advertisement differ from the Hallmark card featuring 
Paris Hilton’s face surrounded by added creative content making reference to a 
catchphrase for which Hilton is well known, which the Ninth Circuit found 
potentially infringing?  The ad does not transform Lohan’s image, though it does 
make reference to an event for which Lohan is well known.  Moreover, if the ad 
only used Lohan’s name—“Ignition locks are appropriate for known drunk drivers 
like Lindsay Lohan, but not for all of us”—it’s very hard to imagine a right of 
publicity claim succeeding, despite the failure to “transform” the name. 
One possible response is that the American Beverage Association’s political 
message deserves protection even absent transformativeness—the message 
“Ignition locks should only be mandated for serious drunk drivers” is sufficiently 
important that use of Lohan’s image to attract attention should be allowed, whereas 
the thought “It would be funny if Paris Hilton worked as a waitress” is of less 
significance.  This distinction would push against the modern trend of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, which usually protects culture as well as overt 
 
 93. Id. at 369. 
 94. Castina W., USA Today Lindsay Lohan Ignition Interlock Ad, POPCRUNCH (May 2, 2008), 
http://perma.cc/SJ3-DTQH. 
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politics,95 and would require courts to figure out what counts as political speech, 
but it could be made.  Such a solution would nonetheless highlight the insufficiency 
of transformativeness as a standard for protecting noncommercial speech.  Absent a 
more robust theory of the proper scope of Lohan’s right, distinctions of this sort 
will inevitably be ad hoc. 
Transformativeness as it has been interpreted in right of publicity cases 
therefore has a chilling effect on any artist who wishes to work, at least in part, in a 
mode of visual realism.  As a First Amendment boundary to the right of publicity, 
transformativeness is inadequate, wrongheaded and discriminatory; it should be 
abandoned rather than reformed. 
The problem is not limited to comics.  As the next Part will show, when it 
comes to video games, courts have been increasingly overt in holding that realistic 
representations—when those representations are visual—can be controlled by 
celebrities.  Following a familiar pattern,96 courts don’t seem to grant the 
comparatively new medium of video games full First Amendment protection.  
Although it’s beyond the scope of this article, I speculate that video games make 
courts uneasy because of their liminality.  Whereas comic books straddle the line 
between word and image, video games are somewhere between watching and 
doing, spectatorship and performance; this can make them analytically slippery.97  
If that’s so, then, just as with comics, the passage of time may not be enough to 
guarantee equal dignity for First Amendment purposes, as it ultimately was for 
radio and movies. 
III.  BEYOND FAKE:  VIDEO GAMES AND THE NEXT WAVE OF 
MEDIUM DISCRIMINATION 
Video games have brought the transformativeness test to its breaking point.  A 
game that shows a person in a context similar to that which brought him or her 
fame is likely to be deemed nontransformative and thus a violation of the right of 
publicity.  The core problem with this conclusion is that it violates what would 
seem to be a simple syllogism:  (1) realistic non-advertising fiction and nonfiction 
about celebrities is outside the scope of the right because of free speech limits;98 (2) 
 
 95. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010). 
 96. See RANDALL P. BEZANSON, ART AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 1 (2009) (“[W]ith newly 
emerging aural and visual technologies, the U.S. Supreme Court has most often declined to apply the 
full force of constitutional protection, at least for a time, proceeding cautiously and in small steps with 
the mediums of radio, television, and film, and, most recently, electronic forms of communication.  The 
Court’s caution has been particularly evident with the more artistic and emotionally powerful genres of 
expression such as dance, film, or video.”).  Notably, the Supreme Court has recognized full First 
Amendment protection for video games; here it is the lower courts that lag behind. 
 97. See, e.g., DEREK A. BURRILL, DIE TRYIN’:  VIDEOGAMES, MASCULINITY, CULTURE 5, 45 
(2008) (noting the ways in which video games confound the spectator/performer distinction).  
 98. See, e.g., Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P. 3d 797, 809 (Cal. 2001) (“[T]he 
transformative elements or creative contributions that require First Amendment protection . . . can take 
many forms, from factual reporting to fictionalized portrayal, from heavy-handed lampooning to subtle 
social criticism.”) (citations omitted). 
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video games are a First Amendment-protected genre of expression, just like textual 
works;99 therefore (3) a realistic non-advertising video game should be outside the 
constitutional reach of the right of publicity as well.  One can imagine 
constitutional epicycles that would allow courts to distinguish a video game in 
which the player’s acts can change the outcomes from both straight biography and 
from Joyce Carol Oates-style roman à clef.  But courts simply haven’t put in the 
work to attempt such distinctions, relying instead on appeals to “realism” that 
assume that only visual representations are realistic and ignore existing First 
Amendment protections for news photography and biographical illustration.100 
The representation/reality collapse apparent in Comedy III’s devaluation of 
realistic images appears again in the video game cases.  In this model, unauthorized 
visual uses seem like involuntary servitude.101  In a particularly revealing comment, 
an early and influential photography case worried over “the humiliation and 
mortification of having [a man’s] picture displayed in places where he would never 
go to be gazed upon, at times when and under circumstances where if he were 
personally present the sensibilities of his nature would be severely shocked.”102  I’d 
be shocked to find myself in the bedroom with my favorite author, and I’m sure 
vice versa, but we don’t generally think there’s something disturbing about reading 
in bed.  In the court’s imagination, however, the inert image seems to be looking 
out into the world in a magical way. 
The judges in a recent video game case picked up on this theme during oral 
argument, invoking the specter of Elvis and Sean Connery being forced to perform 
via hologram when asking if video game companies were free to make realistic 
visual representations of people.103  These questions evidenced the judges’ 
conflation of an image with what it represents.  Elvis and Sean Connery cannot be 
forced to perform by illustrators and programmers, any more than they can be 
mutilated or spindled by mistreating posters of them.  Although the judges would 
recognize that this is true, put in those exact terms, and though they would likely 
defend their terminology as mere shorthand, the compelling power of the image 
 
 99. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729 (2011). 
 100. See supra note 31. 
 101. See, e.g., Pavesich v. New Eng. Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68, 80 (Ga. 1905) (holding that a person 
whose image was used in advertising without his consent would conclude that “his liberty has been 
taken away from him; and, as long as the advertiser uses him for these purposes, he cannot be otherwise 
than conscious of the fact that he is for the time being under the control of another, that he is no longer 
free, and that he is in reality a slave, without hope of freedom, held to service by a merciless master”); 1 
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 2:5; Leslie A. Kurtz, Fictional Characters and Real People, 51 U. 
LOUISVILLE L. REV. 435, 461 (2013) (“When someone’s name and image is used by another in 
advertising, for example, some aspect of that person is under someone else’s control.  It is a form of 
virtual involuntary servitude, of compelled speech. . . . [U]se without permission can be offensive to 
personal autonomy and human dignity, particularly if our surrogate selves are out there doing things we 
would not choose to do, or if we are turned into commodities against our wills.” (emphasis added) 
(footnote omitted)). 
 102. Pavesich, 50 S.E. at 80. 
 103. Oral Argument, Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013) (No. 09-56675l), 
available at http://perma.cc/5XB4-KNQB. 
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helps ease the way to finding that people should control their own images just as 
they control their own bodies. 
One might argue that the judges were merely recognizing audiences’ likely 
reaction—audiences might feel that Elvis and Sean Connery were really 
present104—but why that audience perception would inflict constitutionally 
cognizable harm is still a mystery.  Suppose audiences did come to feel, at least 
subconsciously, that Richard Nixon actually shook hands with the fictional Forrest 
Gump.  Under current law, that can’t count as actionable harm to Nixon because 
mere untruths that don’t hurt a person’s reputation can’t be defamatory.105  
Moreover, since the deceived audiences argument is an empirical claim about how 
people react to images, one would expect it to also be available to plaintiffs 
portrayed in text, if they could meet their burden of proof.  But it’s not; only 
images trigger this “forced labor” reasoning. 
Ultimately, the “involuntary servitude” concept helps extend the publicity right 
past the advertising uses that raise traditional false endorsement concerns.  After 
all, if the image is essentially the same as the person depicted, being enslaved to a 
director making a feature film isn’t obviously different from being enslaved to a 
director making a thirty-second ad.106  Following this logic, courts have allocated 
control over images to their referents in most of the video game cases.107  This Part 
summarizes a few key cases, reserving the most extensive discussion for Hart v. 
Electronic Arts, the first federal appellate case on the matter.108 
In No Doubt v. Activision Publishing, a California court found a violation of the 
right of publicity when the video game at issue used “immutable” images of the 
“real” musicians in the band No Doubt and didn’t transform their context, instead 
having them perform rock songs as they did in life.109  Even though the avatars 
could be manipulated to perform at fanciful venues or to sing songs the real band 
 
 104. Cf. M. Ryan Calo, Against Notice Skepticism in Privacy (and Elsewhere), 87 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 1027, 1039–40 (2012) (discussing evidence that people react to pictures of eyes similarly to being 
actually watched). 
 105. See, e.g., Richie v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 544 N.W.2d 21, 28 (Minn.1996) (stating the 
general rule that defamation requires harm to reputation, although such harm may be presumed from 
certain accusations). 
 106. See In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268, 1290 
(9th Cir. 2013) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (making this point with reference to Forrest Gump and Midnight 
in Paris, both movies that fictionalize real historical figures).  Pavesich, the judicial popularizer of the 
slavery trope, takes care to suggest that use of pictures in articles that are actually about a person are 
probably also subject to the new right the court is recognizing.  50 S.E. at 81.  By contrast, Leslie Kurtz 
contends that recreations of an actor’s appearance and performance in non-advertising works don’t 
implicate the same personhood interests as ads do, but doesn’t explain why not.  Kurtz, supra note 101, 
at 464–65.  Later, she argues that digital creation of a living actor, even in non-advertising works, would 
implicate those personhood interests as long as it is the actor, rather than a character previously 
portrayed by the actor, being represented.  Id. at 478–79.  I find this distinction too evanescent.  As long 
as we recognize the actors, they are as present, and as forced to work for an unwanted master, when 
“they” appear in character as they are when “they” appear as themselves—not at all.   
 107. See William K. Ford & Raizel Liebler, supra note 23, at 4. 
 108. See Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 109. No Doubt v. Activision Publ’g, Inc., 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 397 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011). 
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wouldn’t ever sing, and even though the game had many other creative elements, 
the avatars were still “exact depictions” of the musicians doing what had made 
them famous: performing music.  The use of highly realistic digital depictions “was 
motivated by a desire to capitalize on the band’s fan-base,” so there was a violation 
of the right of publicity.110  This result can be compared to a hypothetical 
biography that is exact in every description and detail, the realism of which would 
plainly fail to justify liability.  (No Doubt was complicated by the presence of a 
contract denying the game company the right to make these changes, but the court 
nonetheless found an independent violation of the right of publicity.111) 
In another California case, by contrast, the surrounding context was held to be 
transformative of the persona.112  Ulala, a character in a futuristic video game, had 
many similarities to the performance identity of singer Lady Miss Kier:  in the 
plaintiff’s words, they shared “distinctive make-up, large eyelashes, doe eyes, 
red/pink hair, pony tails, cute backpacks, mini-skirts, knee-socks, knee-high boots, 
and platform shoes,” and Ulala’s name allegedly sounded like one of Lady Miss 
Kier’s ululations.113 
114  115 
 
The Kirby court held that the game context—in which Ulala was “a space age 
reporter in the 25th century,” not a singer like the plaintiff—was transformative of 
Kier’s identity.116  Sega seemed to have copied her signature phrases, hairstyle and 
clothing choice, but differences in appearances and movement also existed.  As in 
the Winter comic case discussed in Part II, this additional new expression, 
departing from realism, was enough to be transformative, even without a particular 
meaning or message.117 
 
 110. Hart v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141,162 (3rd Cir. 2013) (citing No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d 
at 397). 
 111. No Doubt, 122 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 405. 
 112. Kirby v. Sega of America, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). 
 113. Second Amended Complaint, Kirby v. Sega of Am., Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 607 (Cal. Ct. App. 
2006) (No. BC 294679), 2004 WL 5564733. 
 114. Ulala.jpg, WIKIA SEGA FORUMS, http://perma.cc/UKM5-RPEC (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 115. Miss Lady Kier, 1994, FACEBOOK, http://perma.cc/D776-LNS4?type=image (last visited Oct. 
19, 2014).  
 116. Kirby, 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 618. 
 117. See supra notes 58, 85–86 and accompanying text. 
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The Third Circuit then entered the fray with Hart v. Electronic Arts.118  Hart, a 
former Rutgers football player, sued over Electronic Art’s (EA’s) use of his 
likeness and biographical information (size, weight, jersey number, typical attire of 
visor and armband) in its NCAA Football video games, as well as its use of his 
photo in a photo montage only visible when players selected Rutgers as their team.  
NCAA Football allows users “to experience the excitement and challenge of college 
football” by interacting with “over 100 virtual teams and thousands of virtual 
players.”119  The district court found that EA’s use was protected by the First 
Amendment, but the court of appeals reversed.  The court emphasized that the 
game’s success depended on its focus on realism and detail, “from realistic sounds, 
to game mechanics, to team mascots.”120 
The court of appeals began by acknowledging that video games are fully 
protected by the First Amendment.121  However, such protection can be trumped by 
other rights; Hart’s right of publicity had to be balanced with the interests 
underlying the right to free expression.122  But the court did not actually weigh one 
interest against the other to determine which was stronger.  That failure is not 
surprising since it’s not clear what “weight” really means when it comes to the 
competing values of rewarding celebrities with control over images and allowing 
artists to depict the world.  Rather, the court engaged in a somewhat different 
project of delineating which expressive works would be protected against liability 
despite seeking commercial advantage from use of a celebrity’s identity. 
The court accepted a property theory of the right of publicity:  people’s names 
and likenesses belong to them as property because they are things of value.  
Unauthorized use therefore harms the victim by “diluting the value of the name and 
depriving that individual of compensation.”123  The purpose of the right of publicity 
is to protect an individual’s property interest in an identity gained through labor and 
effort, and to encourage further investment in this property interest.124 
The Hart court identified three approaches to First Amendment limits on the 
right:  the Doe v. TCI “predominant use” test, the trademark-based Rogers test that 
asks whether a use is artistically relevant to the user’s work, and the copyright-
based transformative use test of Comedy III.  The Third Circuit noted that the Doe 
test, asking whether the predominant use of a celebrity’s identity is commercial, is 
“subjective at best, arbitrary at worst, and in either case calls upon judges to act as 
both impartial jurists and discerning art critics.  These two roles cannot co-exist.”125  
 
 118. Hart v. Electronic Arts, Inc., 717 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 148 (citing Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2733 (2011)). 
 122. Id. at 149–50 (citing Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977), and 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)). 
 123. Id. at 151 (quoting McFarland v. Miller, 14 F.3d 912, 919, 923 (3d Cir. 1994)). 
 124. Id. (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573 (“[T]he State’s interest in permitting a ‘right of 
publicity’. . . . is closely analogous to the goals of patent and copyright law, focusing on the right of the 
individual to reap the reward of his endeavors . . . .”). 
 125. Id. at 154. 
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The court declined to delve into whether using Hart’s identity added anything to the 
“First Amendment expressiveness” of EA’s game as a whole: 
Such reasoning . . . leads down a dangerous and rightly-shunned road:  adopting [Doe] 
would be tantamount to admitting that it is proper for courts to analyze select elements 
of a work to determine how much they contribute to the entire work’s expressiveness.  
Moreover, as a necessary (and insidious) consequence, the [Doe] approach would 
suppose that there exists a broad range of seemingly expressive speech that has no 
First Amendment value.126 
The second option, the Rogers rule, takes its name from a Second Circuit case 
involving a Fellini movie, Ginger and Fred.  This movie told the story of two 
Italian dancers who emulated Ginger Rogers and Fred Astaire and were known, in 
the fictional world of the film, by those nicknames.127  Ginger Rogers sued for 
trademark infringement and for violation of her right to publicity.  The Second 
Circuit, citing First Amendment concerns, set forth a rule that the use of a mark (or 
celebrity name) in a title would not be actionable under either head of liability 
unless the mark either:  (1) lacked artistic relevance to the work or (2) was 
explicitly misleading about the source (e.g., an “Official Ginger Rogers Cookbook” 
not endorsed by Rogers).128 
The Hart court rejected Rogers because it would “potentially immunize a broad 
swath of tortious activity.”129  Though Rogers might be useful in “trademark-like 
right of publicity cases” (whatever that might mean),130 the court found it 
inappropriate in the case at bar, because Rogers was a “blunt instrument” that 
didn’t carefully calibrate the “balancing of two fundamental protections:  the right 
of free expression and the right to control, manage, and profit from one’s own 
identity.”131  The court failed to explain why the right of publicity as applied to 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 996–97 (2d Cir. 1989). 
 128. Id. at 999. 
 129. Hart, 717 F.3d at 155.  At the same time, the court noted that the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition restricts the right of publicity to “use for purposes of trade,” which does not 
“ordinarily include the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, works 
of fiction or nonfiction, or in advertising that is incidental to such uses” unless a name or likeness is used 
solely to attract attention to an unrelated work.  Id. at 156.  The Restatement specifically mentions uses 
in articles in fan magazines, feature stories on entertainment programs, unauthorized biographies, 
novels, plays and motion pictures.  Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 
cmt. c (1995)).  This treatment is puzzling at best—the court seemed to suggest that rejecting Rogers 
wouldn’t cause trouble for any of these kinds of expression since they wouldn’t ordinarily be within the 
scope of the right of publicity anyway—but it never explained why a video game then would be, or why 
Rogers would exempt too many works from the scope of the right of publicity if most expressive works 
weren’t covered anyway.  The impression is of a rule constructed just to sweep in video games and 
visual art. 
 130. Hart, 717 F.3d at 157.  The court might have meant “ordinary advertising cases,” though that 
doesn’t make much sense of Rogers, a movie title case.  It might have meant “cases in which the 
celebrity also alleges confusion over endorsement,” though celebrities routinely bring both trademark 
and right of publicity claims, and it also is hard to understand why the legal standard for one claim ought 
to change depending on what other independent claims are alleged along with it.   
 131. Hart, 717 F.3d at 157. 
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noncommercial speech was a fundamental right, or why categorical balancing 
would be inappropriate.  Categorical balancing is often used in First Amendment 
cases,132 and one major reason is to avoid chilling effects133—after all, case-by-
case determination of transformativeness has significant costs for risk-averse 
creators that should be taken into account in any “balancing” endeavor. 
The real problem, the Hart court wrote, was that applying Rogers would let EA 
win.  Hart’s likeness and biographical data were, essentially by definition, relevant 
to a game about NCAA football.  To the court, “[a]dopting this line of reasoning 
threatens to turn the right of publicity on its head.”134  The target audience for 
Hart’s “merchandise and performances” would be sports fans, so products 
“appropriating and exploiting his identity” would do best with them.135  But under 
Rogers, all products (including, in this reasoning, all noncommercial speech) 
targeting the sports fan market would, as a matter of course, relate to Hart and fall 
outside his right of publicity.  This, the Hart court reasoned, couldn’t possibly be 
right. 
Consider how these statements would apply to a conventional print biography 
of Hart.  Would denying Hart control over such a biography “turn the right of 
publicity on its head”?136  What about a photograph accompanying a news story 
about the Rutgers football team?137  What about Joyce Carol Oates’ next roman à 
clef about a college football player who sues a video game company?  All of these 
would find likely audiences among football fans.  The court asserted that “[i]t 
cannot be that the very activity by which [Hart] achieved his renown now prevents 
him from protecting his hard-won celebrity.”138  But this statement begged the 
question of what “protecting” that celebrity could constitutionally mean:  it could 
readily be the case that engaging in noncommercial speech about the very activity 
by which Hart achieved his renown prevents him from maintaining a successful 
claim against the speakers.  Compare the famous Obama “Hope” poster:  It too was 
an unauthorized use of the subject’s image, used in the context of “the very activity 
by which [Obama] achieved his renown,” in this instance politics.  Moreover, 
candidate Obama really did strike optimistic, inspiring, presidential poses, as he did 
in the photo on which the poster was based. 
 
 132. See, e.g., Mark Tushnet, Heller and the Perils of Compromise, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 
419, 424–25 (2009). 
 133. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time:  First Amendment Theory 
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CAL. L. REV. 935, 942–43 (1968). 
 134. Hart, 717 F.3d at 157. 
 135. Id. at 157–58. 
 136. Cf. White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1514 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski, J., 
dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc) (“Intellectual property rights aren’t like some constitutional 
rights, absolute guarantees protected against all kinds of interference, subtle as well as blatant.  They 
cast no penumbras, emit no emanations:  The very point of intellectual property laws is that they protect 
only against certain specific kinds of appropriation.” (footnote omitted)). 
 137. Cf. Montana v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 639 (Cal. App. 1995) (holding 
that “full page newspaper accounts” of Super Bowls, featuring photographs of the star quarterback Joe 
Montana, were protected despite the photos’ use to sell newspapers). 
 138. Hart, 717 F.3d at 158. 
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Having rejected Rogers, the Hart court went on to endorse the observation in 
Rogers that the right of publicity doesn’t have consumer confusion as an element 
and is therefore “potentially broader” than trademark.139  Yet this is a reason why 
the right of publicity should do less well in any balancing test than trademark140—a 
regulation of deceptive speech is more likely to be constitutional than a regulation 
of non-deceptive speech.141  A right of publicity claim shouldn’t trump freedom of 
speech when an equivalent trademark claim, supposedly protecting both the public 
and the trademark owner, wouldn’t be sufficiently weighty to do so.  Instead, the 
Hart court tautologically reasoned that the right of publicity was more important 
because it allowed the celebrity to control more:  “[T]he right of publicity is 
broader and, by extension, protects a greater swath of property interests.  Thus, it 
would be unwise for us to adopt a test that hews so closely to traditional trademark 
principles.”142 
The Hart court therefore turned to a “broader, more nuanced test,” 
transformative use.143  Unlike the artistic relevance test of Rogers, 
transformativeness allows courts “to account for the fact that misappropriation can 
occur in any market segment, including those related to the celebrity.”144  The right 
of publicity, like copyright, applies to noncommercial speech, and as with 
copyright fair use, transformative uses are less likely to interfere with the owner’s 
economic interests.145  Transformativeness could include factual reporting and 
fictionalized portrayal along with parody and satire, though the court did not detail 
what was transformative about factual reporting.  The inquiry, as Comedy III said, 
was “in a sense more quantitative than qualitative, asking whether the literal and 
imitative or the creative elements predominate in the work.”146  The Hart court also 
did not explain what made this inquiry differ from the “judge as art critic” rule it 
 
 139. Id. (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1004 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
 140. See Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing First 
Amendment risks of non-confusion-based liability); cf. Zimmerman, supra note 25, at 74–75 (observing 
that reputation, privacy and similar interests are rarely sufficient to justify overriding First Amendment 
rights to engage in noncommercial speech). 
 141. See Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (“As a general matter, ‘state action to 
punish the publication of truthful information seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.”’ (quoting 
Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979))).  By contrast, deceptive speech can be 
punished in a number of circumstances, at least when it causes harm.  See United States v. Alvarez, 132 
S. Ct. 2537 (2012). 
 142. Hart, 717 F.3d at 158.  Traditional pre-Sullivan defamation law protected a greater swath of 
personality interests than current defamation law; that made it unconstitutional.  New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).  And one could say, as Justice Stevens once did, that the U.S. flag is the 
“property” of the American people, and yet flag burning statutes are still unconstitutional.  See United 
States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 323 (1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Calling an interest “property” 
doesn’t make it First Amendment-immune.  Even the cases upholding expansion of the copyright term 
and restoration of expired foreign copyrights don’t go that far.  See Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873 
(2012); Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).  Nor has any legislature adopting a right of publicity 
engaged in even the token fact-finding backing up copyright term extension or restoration. 
 143. Hart, 717 F.3d at 158. 
 144. Id. at 163. 
 145. Id. at 159. 
 146. Id. (citing Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc. 21 P.3d 797, 810 (Cal. 2001)). 
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rejected from Doe.147  Quoting Comedy III, the court defined the question as 
whether the depiction of the celebrity “has become primarily the defendant’s own 
expression rather than the celebrity’s likeness,” and this “expression” must be “of 
something other than the likeness of the celebrity.”148 
Again, one might well wonder how biographies and news reporting meet this 
standard.149  The key is the unacknowledged medium discrimination:  word 
portraits will never be in jeopardy because to judges textual works will always 
seem to be “the [writer’s] own expression,” and images incidentally present in 
genres associated with writing, such as news and biography, will be protected by 
that association.  Because the writer is seen as necessarily translating the world into 
another medium, and the creator of a visual depiction is not (again, the collapse 
between representation and reality), courts can say blatantly false things such as, 
“[E]ntertainment that is merely a copy or imitation, even if skillfully and accurately 
carried out, does not really have its own creative component and does not have a 
significant value as pure entertainment.”150 
These assertions about visual realism completely misconstrue how audiences 
create meaning.  Players play video games rather than watching stock footage 
because the experiences are qualitatively different.  People go to see impersonators 
instead of watching video of the original performer because the two experiences 
aren’t substitutes.  If the impersonator doesn’t seem significant, consider the 
powerful real-world effect of Tina Fey’s performance of Sarah Palin’s exact 
 
 147. Id. at 154.  Later, the Hart court stated that, unlike the Doe test, transformativeness is “more 
circumscribed,” focusing on specific aspects of a work “that speak to whether it was merely created to 
exploit a celebrity’s likeness.”  Id. at 163.  Even if the celebrity identity has marketing power, that can 
be acceptable, as long as the “work is the creator’s own expression.”  Id.  It’s still hard to figure out how 
that differs from the Doe test of the “primary” value of the work coming from the celebrity, especially 
given that the Hart court ultimately held that NCAA Football wasn’t transformative and thus was 
“merely created to exploit” Hart’s likeness, despite all its other content.  The Hart majority specifically 
ruled that it didn’t matter that Hart was a tiny part of the overall game.  Id.  Consideration of the other 
creative elements was improper, because transformativeness is about “how the celebrity’s identity is 
used in or is altered by other aspects of a work,” without consideration of “[w]holly unrelated elements.”  
Id. at 169.  Consideration of the broader context of a work should be aimed at “whether this context 
acted upon the celebrity identity in a way that transformed it or imbued it with some added creativity 
beyond providing a ‘merely trivial variation.’”  Id. (By this standard, Forrest Gump seems problematic, 
since celebrities appeared therein not to change viewers’ perceptions of the celebrity but to add meaning 
to Forrest Gump’s journey.)  
 148. Id. at 160 (quoting Comedy III, 21 P.3d at 809) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 149. Transformativeness was, in the Hart court’s view, consistent with the Restatement (Third) of 
Unfair Competition, followed by many jurisdictions in defining the scope of the right.  Id. at 165 n.35.  
The examples that the Restatement comments list as protected against liability “all exemplify the sort of 
transformative uses that would generally pass the analysis set forth in Comedy III.”  Id.  Thus, “already-
existing First Amendment protections in right of publicity cases apply to video games with the same 
force as to ‘biographies, documentaries, docudramas, and other expressive works depicting real-life 
figures.’”  Id. at 165.  Yet those categories are listed in the Restatement as examples of types of works 
that would not violate the right of publicity, while the Hart majority held that a video game does violate 
it, so the “same force” appears to operate differently on video games. 
 150. Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981); see also Hart, 717 F.3d 
at 164 (where a work contains “‘merely a copy or imitation’ of the celebrity’s identity . . . there can be 
no First Amendment impediment to a right of publicity claim”). 
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words.151  To suggest that Fey’s performance lacked “its own creative component” 
or “significant value” is hardly credible. 
Hart had one final case to distinguish:  C.B.C. Distribution v. Major League 
Baseball Advanced Media, which found that fantasy baseball leagues didn’t violate 
the right of publicity when using real players’ biographical data to construct 
imaginary leagues for players to “play.”152  Fantasy baseball sounds very much like 
NCAA Football.  But, implicitly admitting the medium discrimination at work, the 
Hart court stated that the baseball players’ records were publicly available 
information and thus protected by the First Amendment.  By contrast, “[t]he 
presence of a digital avatar that recreates Appellant in a digital medium 
differentiates this matter from C.B.C.”153 
But “the presence of a digital avatar” isn’t a reason; it’s a description.  Indeed, 
to the extent that the court was suggesting that the video game did more than use 
publicly available information, it seems to be penalizing the addition of creative 
effort in programming visuals compared to the use of data in textual form, which is 
exactly the opposite of the idea that additional creative input is what limits the 
scope of the right of publicity.  What remains unclear is why the use of a video 
simulation of Hart justifies his victory when the baseball players lost because 
game-makers only used nonvisual information.  A case could be made to give 
celebrities greater rights in pictures than in anything else, and I’ll take that case up 
below, but that’s not what the court purports to be doing with its claim to apply the 
First Amendment with the “same force” to different media, while also maintaining 
that the right of publicity is a right to control the commercial appropriation of 
“identity.”154 
The Hart majority found NCAA Football non-transformative because the game 
sought to create a realistic depiction of college football, including realistic 
representations of players, seeking to capitalize on the fan bases of teams and 
players.  Recreating a likeness in a (visual) medium other than photographs or 
video can’t in itself satisfy the transformativeness test, the court reasoned, or the 
right of publicity would not extend as far as it should.155  Digital Hart did what 
actual Hart did at Rutgers—“he”/he played football.156 
 
 151. See Rebecca Tushnet, Performance Anxiety:  Copyright Embodied and Disembodied, 60 J. 
COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 219 (2013). 
 152. Hart, 717 F.3d at 165 n.37 (citing C.B.C. Distrib. & Mktg., Inc. v. Major League Baseball 
Advanced Media, L.P., 505 F.3d 818 (8th Cir. 2007)). 
 153. Id.  This distinction caused the court some uncertainty about the scope of its holding; having 
relied on the visual as the key determinant of infringement, it then worried about what would happen if 
the visual representation were not very good—suppose players were looking at vague colored blobs that 
happened to bear real players’ names?  “It remains an open question . . . whether right of publicity 
claims can extend into the bygone days of 8-bit graphics and pixilated representations.”  Id. at 166 n.38.  
Here, though, the digital avatar closely resembled the “genuine article” in hair color, hairstyle, skin tone, 
accessories, vital information and biographical details, and perfect realism wasn’t required for 
infringement.  Id. at 166. 
 154. Id. at 165, 169–70. 
 155. Id. at 166 n.39. 
 156. Id. at 166.  But again, this would also have been true of an unauthorized biography or 
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If realism prevents First Amendment protection, deposed Panamanian dictator 
Manuel Noriega might have a plausible right of publicity claim based on the 
appearance of a Noriega-like character in the war game Call of Duty:  Black Ops II, 
performing violent acts similar to those that made Noriega notorious.157  As one 
report explains: 
In Activision’s video game, Noriega initially helps the CIA capture a Nicaraguan 
terrorist, but later turns on the Americans and is hunted himself.  In reality, Noriega 
did work as a CIA informant before the agency broke ties with him.  After the US 
became concerned about his violent rule, President George Bush ordered the invasion 
of Panama in 1989, which resulted in his capture.158 
It sounds as if “[t]he digital [Noriega] does what the actual [Noriega] did while [in 
Panama],”159 even if the “plays” he made weren’t exactly the same.  Under Hart, 
this verisimilitude signals a right of publicity violation, at least where the realism is 
contained in a video game.160  Since the creativity added by the rest of the game 
outside of the avatar is to be disregarded in the Hart majority’s analysis of where 
the value in a video game comes from, Lindsay Lohan might even have a claim 
against Grand Theft Auto V for using a paparazzi-dodging actress type character 
that allegedly looks like her.161 
Reinforcing the de facto separate treatment of video games and other media, the 
majority then held that the single actual photo of Hart at issue was not actionable.  
It was a component of a montage in the 2009 edition of the game, and was 
therefore transformative and protected by the First Amendment.  Like the use of an 
image of Tiger Woods in a collage juxtaposing him with other golf greats,162 
putting the photo in the context of a Rutgers montage “imbue[d] the image with 
additional meaning beyond simply being a representation of the player.”163  (I add 
the emphasis to highlight the slippage between the celebrity and a particular image 
of the celebrity.  The photo puts Hart in the context of the Rutgers team.  
 
docudrama; the court never explained why biographies are transformative, because that went without 
saying.  See Ford & Liebler, supra note 23, at 88–89. 
 157. See Complaint, Noriega v. Activision Blizzard, Inc., No. BC-551747, 2014 WL 3611852 
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 15, 2014). 
 158. Leo Kelion, Manuel Noriega Sues Activision over Call of Duty, BBC NEWS (July 16, 2014), 
http://perma.cc/3HEJ-NE39. 
 159. Hart, 717 F.3d at 166. 
 160. The California Superior Court, holding that “the entirety of the disputed work should . . . be 
considered” in transformativeness analysis, recently dismissed Noriega’s claim, reasoning that Noriega’s 
identity was only part of the “raw materials” from which the entire game was synthesized.  Noriega v. 
Activision/Blizzard, Inc., No. BC-551747, slip. op. at 5 & n.4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2014), available 
at http://perma.cc/XS7B-KQN4.  
 161. Joe Mullin, Lindsay Lohan Sues Makers of GTA V over Look-Alike Complaints, ARS 
TECHNICA (July 3, 2014), http://perma.cc/QBW2-VRAV. 
 162. ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).  Perhaps revealingly, the Hart 
court misread ETW, describing the artwork at issue as a photographic collage, when in fact it was a 
painting.  Hart, 717 F.3d at 161.  For these purposes, apparently all images look alike. 
 163. Hart, 717 F.3d at 170 (emphasis added). 
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According to the majority, that’s transformative.  But the avatar, which plays on the 
digital Rutgers team and is thus always in the context of that team, is not.) 
Judge Ambro dissented, agreeing that transformativeness was the proper test but 
interpreting and applying it differently.  This disagreement itself adds credence to 
the objection that transformativeness requires judges to become art critics, 
especially in the context of the right of publicity where the question does not 
involve comparing two creative works and identifying their differences as it does in 
a copyright fair use analysis.  Judge Ambro would have given weight to the fact 
that Hart’s avatar was part of a much larger storyline involving plenty of creativity 
supplied by EA.164 
Following the syllogism that began this Part, Judge Ambro pointed out that the 
majority, despite its nods toward medium neutrality, failed to be neutral in its use 
of the test.  “EA’s use of real-life likenesses as ‘characters’ in its NCAA Football 
video game should be as protected as portrayals (fictional or nonfictional) of 
individuals in movies and books.”165  The use of realism to increase profits—
which, in the majority’s view, showed lack of transformativeness—could not 
remove First Amendment protection from a work.166 
A month later, the Ninth Circuit also held, using essentially identical reasoning 
to that of the Hart majority, that NCAA Football wasn’t transformative.167  On the 
same day, it held that EA’s Madden NFL games were protected against Lanham 
Act false endorsement challenges because, under Rogers, their realism made the 
use of celebrity identities artistically relevant to the games.168  The same realism 
that triggered First Amendment protection against the Lanham Act condemned 
EA’s games under the right of publicity.169  Of particular note, the Ninth Circuit 
 
 164. Id. at 171–73.  As Judge Ambro elaborated, users who selected the 2005 Rutgers team (and 
didn’t change the avatar’s characteristics) would experience the numerous creative elements of the game 
as part of every fictional play.  Thus, Hart’s likeness was one of the raw materials from which a new 
work was synthesized, rather than the sum and substance of the work in question.  Id. at 175. 
 165. Id. at 174. 
 166. “This approach is at odds with the First Amendment protection afforded to expressive works 
incorporating real-life figures.  That protection does not depend on whether the characters are depicted 
realistically or whether their inclusion increases profits.”  Id. at 174. 
 167. In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d 1268 (9th Cir. 
2013).   
 168. Brown v. Elec. Arts, Inc., 724 F.3d 1235 (9th Cir. 2013).  As it turns out, this speech-
protective rule, which makes inquiry into actual consumer confusion unnecessary, might well accurately 
capture consumer perceptions.  In a survey by authors whose discussion indicates support for the 
extension of the right of publicity to video games, only 10% of video game players believed that the 
athletes depicted were endorsing the games—a percentage low enough to indicate lack of likely 
confusion, especially given that this is a gross percentage and not a net percentage after controlling for 
misunderstanding and other forms of noise.  See Galen Clavio, Anastasios Kaburakis, David A. Pierce, 
Patrick Walsh & Heather Lawrence, College Athlete Representations in Sports Video Games, 6 J. ISSUES 
INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS 57 (2013) (finding that 15% of respondents surveyed were uncertain 
about whether athletes were endorsing the video games and 10% thought they were doing so; “the more 
familiar a consumer was with the game, the less likely he/she was to believe the players are endorsing 
the products”). 
 169. See In re NCAA, 724 F.3d at 1279.  Trademark law has its own pathologies, but in expressive 
use trademark cases courts have paid more attention to First Amendment issues even with respect to 
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agreed with the Hart majority that it was the visual element of the games that 
stripped them of the First Amendment protection otherwise available for the use of 
publicly available data such as players’ statistics.170 
After these cases, we are left with a body of law out of step with the rest of First 
Amendment doctrine, which discriminates against visual realism for no articulated 
reason.  Could such a reason be given?  The next Part takes up that challenge. 
 
IV.  POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT 
OF IMAGES 
Even in restrictive states such as New York, the right of publicity, both in 
statutes and at common law, invariably covers both names and likenesses.171  In 
practice, however, that equality does not apply to noncommercial speech, where 
only images—or moving images—are actionable.  Is this really medium 
discrimination?  Or are courts recognizing that people process images differently 
than words, making use of an image relevantly different from use of a name?  
What’s at stake in this determination is precisely what we think the First 
Amendment is for. 
Why might a person’s interest in controlling uses of her picture override another 
person’s right to engage in noncommercial speech when an interest in controlling 
uses of her name would not?  This argument could be framed in terms of impact, 
excess or harm.  If a person’s right of publicity interest increases because of the 
greater communicative impact of the image—whether rational or not—that usually 
is an unsound justification from a First Amendment perspective.  Speakers 
generally have a strong free speech interest in choosing for themselves the most 
effective forms in which to disseminate their messages.172  Even advertisers have 
substantial freedom to choose non-deceptive, non-defamatory images with which to 
tout their products, because different visual images may communicate different 
things, affecting the advertiser’s persuasive message.173 
 
images, possibly because courts at least think they know what trademark is for—unlike the even more 
amorphous right of publicity—and thus can better appreciate that trademark’s consumer protection 
function doesn’t require giving trademark owners control over noncommercial speech.  See, e.g., Mattel 
Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (protecting artistic use of Barbie doll 
against Mattel’s trademark and copyright claims). 
 170. See, e.g., In re NCAA, 724 F.3d  at 1283 n.12 (distinguishing the fantasy baseball protected in 
C.B.C. Distribution, because of the “big difference” created by the use of visual avatars, whereas fantasy 
baseball just used names, performance and biographical data). 
 171. See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 6.8 (chart showing that every state statute protects name 
and likeness); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (1995) (defining common-law 
right to cover name and likeness).  Many courts simply speak of “identity” when discussing the 
common-law right; I am unaware of any case that recognizes the right of publicity but refuses to protect 
a name or likeness that actually identifies the plaintiff. 
 172. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (reversing conviction for disturbing the peace 
based on defendant’s “Fuck the Draft” jacket, worn inside a courthouse, and noting “it is . . .  often true 
that one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”). 
 173. See Disc. Tobacco City & Lottery, Inc. v. United States, 674 F.3d 509, 547–48 (6th Cir. 
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One might argue that photographs (though not necessarily video game avatars) 
convey more information than words, which always fail to fully describe their 
subjects, and that this additional information is excessive and unnecessary.174  
While photographs leave plenty of detail out as well, they may seem more 
complete, contributing to their greater impact.175  Yet the First Amendment’s 
general solicitude for conveying (non-defamatory) information makes greater 
information content a reason to grant images more First Amendment protection, not 
less.  If the theory is that an excess of visual information is less important than 
nonvisual information, that’s again usually a judgment that the First Amendment 
requires to be left to individual speakers.176 
If the rationale for disparate treatment is instead that the image does more harm 
than the use of the name,177 we again have to ask why, especially when we are 
 
2012) (invalidating ban on use of color in most tobacco advertisements and noting color’s use in, among 
other things, getting attention and conveying information). 
 174. See Douglas v. Hello!, Ltd., [2007] UKHL 21 (H.L.) [326] (appeal taken from Eng.) (holding 
that wedding photos contained extra, protectable information beyond mere facts:  “information as to 
how the wedding looked . . . bring the event to life and make the viewer a virtual spectator at it”); 
Douglas v. Hello!, Ltd., [2005] EWCA (Civ) 595 [84] (photographs “are not merely a method of 
conveying information that is an alternative to verbal description.  They enable the person viewing the 
photographs to act as a spectator, in some circumstances voyeur would be the more appropriate noun, of 
whatever it is that the photographs depict.”); Justin Hughes, The Photographer’s Copyright—
Photograph as Art, Photograph as Database, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH 329, 337–38, (2012) (discussing 
English cases, which conceptualize privacy violations through photos as “the disclosure of detailed 
information”; the visceral nature of photos, he suggests, “is a function of the sheer amount of 
information the photo conveys” and “cannot be separated from it being an incredibly detailed 
database”).   
 175. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 692–93; see also NEAL FEIGENSON & CHRISTINA SPIESEL, LAW 
ON DISPLAY 7–9 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 1st ed. 2009) (discussing features of 
photographs that make them seem more complete and easy to understand than text); WILLIAM J. 
MITCHELL, THE RECONFIGURED EYE:  VISUAL TRUTH IN THE POST PHOTOGRAPHIC ERA 40, 83–84, 192 
(1992) (explaining how photography’s claims to truth are in fact dependent on context); Rudolf 
Arnheim, The Images of Pictures and Words, 2 WORD & IMAGE 306, 308–10 (1986) (distinguishing 
between what is depicted in a photo or film clip and what the depiction means). 
 176. See W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632–33 (1943). 
 177. By comparison, consider the treatment of crime scene and autopsy photos, where the harm of 
unauthorized disclosure is not pecuniary but emotional distress to the families of the deceased.  Some 
courts are willing to assume, in the course of freedom of information litigation, that autopsy and crime 
scene photographs are more distressing than words conveying the events or situations depicted in the 
photos.  See, e.g., State v. Rolling, No. 91-3832 CF A, 1994 WL 722891, at *6 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 1994) 
(reasoning that photos could be withheld to protect family interests, in part because written documents 
could provide similar information to that contained in the photographs without causing the same 
distress); Campus Commc’ns, Inc. v. Earnhardt, 821 So. 2d 388, 392–93 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2002) 
(same rationale); Megan Bittakis, Tragic Representations:  The Curious Contradiction Between Cases 
Seeking Access to Autopsy and Death Scene Photographs and Cases Regarding the Consequences of 
Such Photographs Being Published, 40 N. KY. L. REV. 161 (2013).  Other decisions, generally but not 
uniformly older, have equated the information in a crime scene photo to that in a written description.  
See, e.g., Kelley v. Post Publ’g Co., 98 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Mass. 1951) (“A newspaper account or a radio 
broadcast setting forth in detail the harrowing circumstances of the accident might well be as distressing 
to the members of the victim’s family as a photograph of the sort described in the declaration.”); 
Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Publ’g Co., 76 N.W.2d 762, 768 (Iowa 1956) (“From a news standpoint the 
public is interested in the appearance of the body of such a local victim.  Such appearance may be 
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dealing with constructed images, such as those in video games, that cannot be taken 
to be “real” representations of what a person actually did but at most 
reconstructions or simulations.  Though neither the name nor the image can 
actually be used to conjure with, the idea could be that the use of the image works a 
greater intrusion into the dignity of the person than mere use of a name.178  But 
given First Amendment doctrine’s general tolerance for dignitary intrusions when 
the intrusions involve falsity, it seems hard to understand why the right of publicity 
would extend to non-false representations of publicly known facts, such as a 
person’s appearance or athletic record, even if the representations were experienced 
as loss of control.  In other areas of law, public figures are required to grow thicker 
skins. 
Finally, the idea might be that images are just more valuable and thus the 
celebrity loses more if she can’t control her image than if she can’t control her 
name in noncommercial speech.  One related argument is that images are better at 
conveying emotion, and emotion is where celebrity value is strongest.  The 
empirical literature on the value of celebrity endorsements generally doesn’t 
distinguish between use of names and use of pictures, most likely because 
advertisers with actual endorsement contracts tend to use both.179  However, what 
we know about images suggests that they do affect memory and emotion 
differently than words, though not always in predicted or logical directions, 
especially over the long term.180 
Regardless, the logic of giving celebrities a right to control emotional value 
only makes sense for advertising.  If a noncommercial speaker is using a celebrity 
because that’s the best way to get an emotional message across, then that choice 
should generally be respected.181  The “images are different” argument seems to 
reduce to this:  images have more value than words, and if there’s value, then there 
should be a right to control that value.182  But free riding, absent some harm that 
 
pictured by words or by photographs or both.”). 
 178. Cf. Von Hannover v. Germany, App. No. 59320/00, 40 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1, 24 (2004) (“the 
protection of the rights and reputation of others takes on particular importance” with photographs 
because the images can contain “very personal or even intimate ‘information’ about an individual”). 
 179. Carsten Erfgen, Impact of Celebrity Endorsement on Brand Image:  A Communication 
Process Perspective on 30 Years of Empirical Research, 40 RES. PAPERS ON MARKETING & RETAILING, 
UNIV. OF HAMBURG 1, 13 (2011) (“Research that considers advertising channel characteristics as a 
possible intervening variable for celebrity endorsement success is scant: . . . . [and only studies] high 
versus low prestige magazine[s]”).  
 180. See, e.g., Cristina Carmody Tilley, I Am a Camera:  Scrutinizing the Assumption that 
Cameras in the Courtroom Furnish Public Value by Operating as a Proxy for the Public 50 (Apr. 4, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://perma.cc/M6MX-2K94 (summarizing research on 
the difference between words and images in news as finding that “general television news featuring live 
footage or photos is worse than other media at conveying information but potentially better at engaging 
emotion and developing opinion”). 
 181. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 
1989) (rejecting a requirement that defendant have no adequate alternative to the challenged use as 
being inadequate to protect public’s interest in free expression as applied to intangible rights). 
 182. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity:  Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi 
Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 397, 405 (1990) (criticizing “if value, then right” reasoning in 
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makes a person worse off than she was before the speech, is generally insufficient 
to justify regulating even false speech.183 
There’s also a mismatch between the idea that images are more valuable and the 
claim that transformativeness, specifically, is what protects certain artistic uses.  If 
the raw materials are themselves especially valuable, why can they be taken as long 
as the taker adds her own creative labor?  The reasoning might be that 
transformative uses offer the public something new, but the doctrine hasn’t 
required defendants to offer new insights or commentary on the celebrity; Jonah 
Hex could have offered new monstrous villains without using the Winter brothers.  
And NCAA Football, for its part, was a new expressive experience that the 
plaintiffs themselves could not provide.  No court has offered an explanation of 
how much transformativeness is necessary to offset the extra value of the image. 
Moreover, the free riding justification neglects visual artists’ own input into 
their representations.  Consider Noel Cruz, who repaints licensed dolls so that they 
look more like their human referents.  His dolls cost hundreds and even thousands 
of dollars more than the mass-produced versions.  According to his website: 
Noel Cruz is one of the most versatile & distinguished repaint artists in the doll 
community.  He is most recognized for his character & celebrity based dolls due to 
their uncanny resemblance to the people they portray. . . . His repaints as well as his 
portraits are done with intricate detail to the point of being naturally lifelike in 
essence. . . . The beauty of repaints is that almost no two are exactly alike just as no 
two artists are alike. 
What defines Noel’s style of repaint is his focus in achieving a sense of both 
aesthetics and likeness.184 
 
 
intellectual property); see also Felix Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
COLUM. L. REV. 809, 815 (1935) (noting the circularity inherent in the argument that there should be an 
exclusive right because the right would be valuable if it enabled the owner to exclude others). 
 183. See United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537 (2012); cf. Harris v. Quinn, 134 S. Ct. 2618 
(2014) (stating that prevention of free riding is not a compelling interest in the context of compelled 
payment of union dues). 
 184. NCRUZ.COM, http://perma.cc/KZX5-D9PF (last visited Oct. 19, 2014).  
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The distinction Comedy III and Hart tried to draw between artistry and 
reproduction collapses:  the artistry is in the realism, at least the variety of realism 
that an audience deems appropriate for the medium.  These repainted dolls are, 
according to Cruz, representations of reality that only he could create.186  Nor is 
this claim paradoxical:  many artistic traditions identify originality and creativity in 
each artist’s unique version of the truth as she sees it.187  And society benefits as 
well from multiple viewpoints and wide variety in art forms, rather than channeling 
art into a particular relationship with (what the majority deems to be) reality.  The 
veridical force of Cruz’s sculptures should not distinguish them from works of 
poetry or biography, despite the different ways in which the works make their truth 
claims.  Transformativeness as a First Amendment dividing line does not address 
why creativity in the service of visual realism should be disregarded. 
Finally, related to the free riding argument, one might distinguish between 
marketability driven by realism and marketability driven by desire to possess some 
artifact representing the celebrity, and allocate the latter to the celebrity’s control.  
The materiality of the desired object, in this reasoning, would make it less like 
speech and more like conduct.188  As with the artistic discrimination inherent in the 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903) (“The copy is the 
personal reaction of an individual upon nature.  Personality always contains something unique.  It 
expresses its singularity even in handwriting, and a very modest grade of art has in it something 
irreducible, which is one man’s alone.”). 
 187. See Tushnet, supra note 3, at 728 (“Our standards for realism change over time.  A partial list 
of visual realisms from the last century alone includes Soviet socialist realism, French poetic realism, 
Italian neorealism, new realism (1950s), new realism (1980s), and even cubism in its attempts to 
represent the true restlessness of the human eye.  All these realisms had different concerns and produced 
markedly stylistically distinct works.” (footnote omitted)); see also LORRAINE DASTON & PETER 
GALISON, OBJECTIVITY 18, 318, 363 (2007) (discussing competing understandings of realism that 
coexisted and changed). 
 188. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Speech and “Speech”—Obscenity and “Obscenity”:  An Exercise in 
the Interpretation of Constitutional Language, 67 GEO. L.J. 899, 923 (1979) (arguing that pornography 
is more like sex than it is like speech). 
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Comedy III approach, that rule would require a level of psychological astuteness I 
doubt courts can provide.  Celebrity fans, like everyone else, routinely make 
distinctions about the quality of artifacts.  Just as Princess Diana connoisseurs 
might choose a Cruz doll over a mass-market version, purchasers of Saderup’s 
lithographs chose them over undoubtedly cheaper posters of the Three Stooges.189  
The reason, most plausibly, is the artistic specifics of the lithographs.190  Nor are 
football fans generally buying EA games as relics of the Saints; they buy the games 
to play them—that is, to interact with them as communicative works.  Even a fetish 
object theory of the right of publicity, then, couldn’t explain the decisions we have. 
Ultimately, none of the incompletely theorized reasons why visual 
discrimination might be justified in the right of publicity context hold up under 
scrutiny.  Comics, video games and other visual media deserve the same treatment 
as novels and magazine articles.  Given that celebrities shouldn’t have general 
control over information about themselves—whether that information is conveyed 
textually or visually—the constitutionally sound approach would be to limit the 
right of publicity to commercial speech.191  The exception to this approach is the 
rare Zacchini situation in which the right essentially serves as a common-law 
copyright to protect against retransmission of an entire unfixed performance—a 
kind of anti-bootlegging rule.192  That limited protection is a far cry from 
preventing speakers from evoking a celebrity’s identity in their own speech. 
 
 189. As of July 2014, Saderup lithographs retail at $20 directly from the artist, see Order, 
GARYSADERUP.COM, http://perma.cc/6MGM-988S (last visited Oct. 9, 2014), while Three Stooges 
posters with a similar pose to that in Saderup’s lithograph can be purchased starting from $4.99, see 
ALLPOSTERS, http://perma.cc/L6G6-5P2R (last visited Oct. 9, 2014). 
 190. And even if they are buying in order to express some sort of affective relation to the celebrity, 
what’s unworthy about that?  If wanting a bust of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. is fetishism, how is it 
different from saluting (or burning) the flag?  Cf. Martin Luther King, Jr. Ctr. for Soc. Change, Inc. v. 
Am. Heritage Prods., Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697, 703 (Ga. 1982) (finding that sales of a bust of Dr. King 
violated his right of publicity).  Another word for fetishization in this context would be communication.  
As Professor Diane Zimmerman has written,  
[T]he mere fact that information appears on a utilitarian object does not deprive it of its identity 
as speech.  Many products carry such significant communicative freight that they are clearly 
purchased by consumers for what they “say” rather than for what they do. . . .  [S]omeone who 
wants to wear Tom Hanks’ face on his or her chest surely views the t-shirt that carries the image 
as a secondary and relatively unimportant component of the package.  The use of these kinds of 
images to associate oneself with an era or an attitude toward life or the adoration of a “hero” or 
celebrity is difficult to distinguish intellectually from the impulses that back in the 1960’s led 
Mr. Cohen to wear his jacket with the logo “Fuck the Draft” into the courthouse or young Mr. 
Tinker to go to school with a black armband on. 
Zimmerman, supra note 25, at 63 (footnotes omitted). 
 191. To the extent a right of publicity is constitutional and advisable, it tracks the justification for 
trademark law.  See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn From 
Trademark Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1161 (2006). 
 192. See, e.g., 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 11:55 (“The proper category for Zacchini’s claim 
was the state law of common law copyright, not the right of publicity.”); Dogan & Lemley, supra note 
191, at 1187 (arguing that Zacchini’s theory was closest to common-law copyright); Wendy J. Gordon, 
An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright:  The Challenges of Consistency, Consent and Encouragement 
Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1365 n.97 (1989) (noting that state common-law copyright in 
performances is sometimes called “right of publicity”); cf. Comedy III Prods., Inc. v. Gary Saderup, 
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V.  COPYRIGHT PREEMPTION:  SOUND AND VISION 
The First Amendment isn’t the only federal law in tension with the modern right 
of publicity.  Because courts have refused to limit the right of publicity according 
to ordinary First Amendment constraints, copyright law has been forced into 
service, with extremely uneven results.  Images aren’t the only media responsible 
for these problems—music, which textually-focused courts also have trouble with, 
has presented the other key source of confusion193—but the law’s difficulty 
conceptualizing the scope of an “image” has substantially contributed to the 
resulting mess. 
The basic problem is this:  a creative work is ordinarily exploitable at will by its 
owner.  Where the work depicts an identifiable person, the right of publicity can 
interfere with that exploitation, even if the person consented to appear in the 
work.194  Copyright law has not handled this clash of rights well, and the troubles 
seem related to confusion about images versus the people they represent, and about 
how images differ from other modes of representation.195 
The Copyright Act has an explicit preemption provision, § 301, which bars 
state-law causes of action that confer rights equivalent to copyright.196  This is 
designed to ensure that states do not protect that which Congress has determined 
must be free for all to use, such as ideas or works whose copyright has expired.  In 
a common formulation of the preemption test, a state-law right is preempted under 
§ 301 if it is violated merely by copying something falling within the subject matter 
of copyright, and if it also lacks an “extra element” such as consumer deception.197 
However, courts often reject the argument that § 301 preempts right of publicity 
claims, concluding that the right protects an interest distinct from that protected by 
copyright,198 even though both rights purportedly have the same incentive-based 
 
Inc., 21 P.3d 797, 806 (Cal. 2001) (“To be sure, Zacchini was not an ordinary right of publicity case:  
the defendant television station had appropriated the plaintiff’s entire act, a species of common law 
copyright violation.”). 
 193. Compare Sinatra v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (barring a 
right of publicity claim against advertising use of a song allegedly associated with the plaintiff, but not 
performed by her), with Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (allowing a right of 
publicity claim against advertising use of a song associated with the plaintiff and performed by a sound-
alike). 
 194. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 197 F.3d 1284, 1286 (9th Cir. 1999) (Kozinski, J., dissenting 
from denial of reh’g en banc). 
 195. For a small sampling of articles on copyright preemption and the right of publicity, see Joseph 
P. Bauer, Addressing the Incoherency of the Preemption Provision of the Copyright Act of 1976, 10 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1 (2007); James M. Chadwick & Roxana Vatanparast, The Copyright Act’s 
Preemption of Right of Publicity Claims, 25 COMM. LAW. 1 (2008); P. Stephen Fardy, Feet of Clay:  
How the Right of Publicity Exception Undermines Copyright Act Preemption, 12 TEX. INTELL. PROP. 
L.J. 443 (2004); Schuyler Moore, Straightening Out Copyright Preemption, 9 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 201 
(2002); Richard S. Robinson, Preemption, the Right of Publicity, and a New Federal Statute, 16 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 183 (1998). 
 196. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
 197. See, e.g., Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1005 (9th Cir. 2001); 2 
MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 11:48. 
 198. See, e.g., Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619, 623–24 (6th Cir. 2000); Waits 
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justification.199  The “extra element” test has proven insufficient to resolve 
conceptual difficulties.200  For example, an influential Ninth Circuit case found no 
preemption where Abercrombie & Fitch used a photo of the plaintiff in a catalog.201  
By contrast, the same circuit had previously found preemption when a movie actor 
alleged that his name and likeness appeared in counterfeit films:  “[T]he essence of 
[the actor]’s claim is that the . . . defendants reproduced and distributed the [films] 
without authorization.”202  Likewise, a California court found right of publicity 
claims by performers in a film preempted when their complaint was that the film 
was released without their consent (because they hadn’t been paid).203 
It’s tempting to say that the difference is that Abercrombie & Fitch ran an ad, 
whereas the other defendants didn’t, but the court didn’t take that route, in 
significant part because § 301 doesn’t easily support drawing the line at ads.  
Instead, the Abercrombie & Fitch court attempted to distinguish these contrary 
cases by claiming that those claims were based on copyrightable performances, 
whereas the catalog only included uncopyrightable names and likenesses (presented 
in the catalog text and the photo itself).204  But video doesn’t just contain 
performances.  It contains images—that is, likenesses—and usually includes the 
performers’ names as well, as it did in the very cases the Abercrombie & Fitch 
court tried to distinguish.205  If the presence of copyrightable material in a photo—
the artistic choices made by the photographer that create a particular depiction of 
the subject—doesn’t lead to preemption because names and likenesses are 
 
v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d 1093, 1100 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Ashley D. Hayes, The Right of Publicity 
and Protection of Personas:  Preemption Not Required, 51 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1049 (2001) (arguing that 
the right of publicity protects different interests and thus is not equivalent to copyright); Jeffrey A. 
Trueman, Is It Live or Is It a Soundalike?:  Federal Copyrights in Soundalike Recordings and 
Preemption of State Publicity Claims, 1 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 80 (1999) (same type of argument). 
 199. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1977) (justifying right of 
publicity with economic incentive theory); Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, 448 F.3d 1134, 1145 (9th Cir. 
2006) (“Both copyright and the right of publicity are means of protecting an individual’s investment in 
his or her artistic labors.”).  Indeed, some have suggested that the right approved by Zacchini should 
properly be understood only as a kind of common-law copyright in an entire performance, and that on its 
own terms the case should not apply to many situations not involving direct copying of an entire 
performance.  See Zimmerman, supra note 25. 
 200. See Jennifer E. Rothman, Copyright Preemption and the Right of Publicity, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. 
Rev. 199, 228–29 (2002) (summarizing criticisms of the extra element test). 
 201. Downing, 265 F.3d 994. 
 202. Jules Jordan Video, Inc. v. 144942 Canada, Inc., 617 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010); see 
also Milo & Gabby, LLC v. Amazon.com, Inc., No. C13-1932, 2014 WL 1411849 (W.D. Wash. 2014) 
(finding § 301 preemption of right of publicity claim based on reproduction of photos showing 
plaintiffs’ children; “the essence of Plaintiffs’ right of publicity claim is that Amazon reproduced and 
distributed photographs of the . . . children without authorization to do so”). 
 203. Fleet v. CBS, Inc., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (finding claims by 
performers in film preempted; “it was not merely [plaintiffs’] likenesses which were captured on film—
it was their dramatic performances which are . . . copyrightable”).   
 204. Downing, 265 F.3d at 1005 n.4. 
 205. See Jules Jordan, 617 F.3d at 1154; Fleet, 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 647 (allegations in video case 
included unauthorized use of names and likenesses).   
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uncopyrightable, then the presence of copyrightable performances in a video 
shouldn’t either. 
The Seventh Circuit also found no preemption in a photo reuse case, Toney v. 
L’Oreal USA, relying heavily on the influential treatise by J. Thomas McCarthy. 206  
McCarthy reasons that a photograph of a person is not the same thing as the person 
depicted in the photo and that the right of publicity implicates only the latter.207  
According to McCarthy, a photograph “is merely one copyrightable ‘expression’ of 
the underlying ‘work,’ which is the plaintiff as a human being.  There is only one 
underlying ‘persona’ of a person protected by the right of publicity.”  By contrast, 
“[t]here may be dozens or hundreds of photographs which fix certain moments in 
that person’s life.”208  While McCarthy is correct to distinguish the person from a 
photograph of a person (and setting aside his unitary theory of the self), the fact 
that a persona is not copyrightable does not end the inquiry even under § 301.  
Facts are not copyrightable, nor are works that are in the public domain because 
they were published a hundred years ago, yet a state law that protected either as 
such would plainly be preempted.  Congress intended to preclude states from 
giving copyright-like protection to matter within the general scope of copyright 
even if that matter was not copyrightable.209 
Regardless, Toney concluded that the photographic subject’s identity wasn’t 
“fixed” because it extended past any particular photograph.210  Thus, there was no 
“work of authorship” at issue in her claim, and no right equivalent to copyright.211  
Notably, the Seventh Circuit dismissed the relevance of its previous decision 
finding preemption of baseball players’ claims against television broadcasts of their 
games: 
[That earlier case, Baltimore Orioles,] simply does not stand for the proposition that 
the right of publicity as protected by state law is preempted in all instances by federal 
copyright law; it does not sweep that broadly. . . . Baltimore Orioles holds that state 
laws that intrude on the domain of copyright are preempted even if the particular 
 
 206. Toney v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 406 F.3d 905, 908–09 (7th Cir. 2005).  But see Balt. Orioles, 
Inc. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 805 F.2d 663, 676–78 (7th Cir. 1986) (finding that 
baseball players’ right of publicity claims based on broadcasts of games were preempted because the 
claims fell within the subject matter of copyright and were equivalent to the baseball club/copyright 
owner’s exclusive right to distribute the broadcast). 
 207. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 11:52. 
 208. Id.; cf. Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that a voice is not 
copyrightable; by the same logic, there are many recordings in which a voice could be fixed). 
 209. See, e.g., Montz v. Pilgrim Films & Television, Inc., 649 F.3d 975, 979 (9th Cir. 2011) (“For 
preemption purposes, ideas and concepts that are fixed in a tangible medium fall within the scope of 
copyright . . . despite the exclusion of fixed ideas from the scope of actual federal copyright 
protection.”). 
 210. Toney, 406 F.3d at 910; see also KNB Enters. v. Matthews, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 713 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 2000) (models’ right of publicity claims against unauthorized publisher of photos were not 
preempted because a likeness is not copyrightable). 
 211. Toney, 406 F.3d at 910; see also id. (“Identity, as we have described it, is an amorphous 
concept that is not protected by copyright law; thus, the state law protecting it is not preempted.”). 
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expression is neither copyrighted nor copyrightable.212 
The court did not explain what made the players’ claim in Baltimore Orioles 
intrude on the domain of copyright, given that they, too, were making claims based 
on appropriation of their likenesses, or why the plaintiff’s claim didn’t so intrude 
notwithstanding that the defendants licensed the copyright in the picture of her that 
they used.  Future claimants were left to speculate.213 
When the medium is nonvisual, the cases have a different pattern.  A number of 
courts will find preemption when the defendant used a song without the 
performer’s consent but with a copyright license.214  These cases have not 
successfully distinguished the song and photograph cases:  the right of publicity 
purports to cover both image and voice, but somehow the courts found something 
extra in the image that allowed the right of publicity claim to survive copyright 
preemption, and not something extra in the voice.215  This divergence may also be 
related to the idea that the creator of a visual image—the photographer—doesn’t do 
as much work as the creator of a sound recording, since a photograph simply 
represents reality.  The photograph’s copyright might then seem less important than 
a copyright in a sound recording.  The Ninth Circuit offered a more attractive, but 
doctrinally inaccurate, distinction between the photo and song cases:  the photo 
 
 212. Id. at 910–11. 
 213. There was a violation of a contractual restriction limiting the use of the picture in Toney; the 
court could have rested its decision entirely on contract law, because an actual agreement between the 
parties can provide the necessary extra element to avoid preemption, but it didn’t. 
 214. See, e.g., Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1139–41 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding 
that a sound recording in which a performance was fixed was within the subject matter of copyright, and 
thus performer’s claims based on unauthorized use of the sound recording were preempted); cf. Sinatra 
v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 435 F.2d 711 (9th Cir. 1970) (rejecting claim based on use of a song 
allegedly associated with plaintiff, and singers dressed like plaintiff, in a television advertisement); 
Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 462 (9th Cir. 1988) (explaining that Sinatra was a preemption 
case and holding that a claim based on imitation of voice was not preempted).  But see Brown v. Ames, 
201 F.3d 654 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding no preemption where sound recordings were reproduced and 
plaintiffs were truthfully identified as the singers through use of their photos and names).  Laws 
involved use of a sample of plaintiff’s performance in a new sound recording; it could have been much 
more easily resolved by a right of publicity that covered only commercial uses.  The court distinguished 
the seemingly similar claim in Midler by explaining that the Laws defendant licensed the use of the 
recording in which the plaintiff’s voice was fixed, whereas the defendant in Midler only licensed the use 
of the musical work, not a recording of Midler herself.  Laws, 448 F.3d at 1140–41. 
 215. See Laws, 448 F.3d at 1141 (“[F]ederal copyright law preempts a claim alleging 
misappropriation of one’s voice when the entirety of the allegedly misappropriated vocal performance is 
contained within a copyrighted medium . . . . [T]he fact that the vocal performance was copyrighted 
demonstrates that what is put forth here as protectible is not ‘more personal than any work of 
authorship.’” (citation omitted)).  The court stated that its rulings were consistent with the plaintiff 
victories in two previous voice imitation cases, because “[n]either of those imitations was contained in a 
copyrighted vocal performance.”  Id.  This just wasn’t true, since the imitators’ performances were fixed 
and copyrightable in themselves.  What was true was that the plaintiff in Laws had consented to the 
fixation of her voice in the recording that was used in Laws, and that might provide the basis for a 
distinction, since the owner of the copyright in the sound recording could reasonably expect that the 
performer wouldn’t interfere with the copyright owner’s exercise of rights, absent some contractual 
reservation.  See Rothman, supra note 200, at 231 (making a similar argument about the irrelevance of 
copyrightability and the relevance of consent). 
TUSHNET, A MASK THAT EATS INTO THE FACE:  IMAGES AND THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY, 38 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 157 (2015)  
200 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS [38:2 
 
cases involved advertising uses.216  If that had been the rationale of Abercrombie & 
Fitch, it would have been a much better and more limited decision.217 
A solid line between advertising and non-advertising uses would be a good idea, 
but current preemption doctrine doesn’t achieve that result.  Instead, courts have 
inconsistently used preemption to limit claims against noncommercial speech, since 
the First Amendment isn’t doing the job.  There are exceptions in both directions, 
but courts do seem more likely to uphold right of publicity claims based on the 
reuse of a copyrighted work in an ad, and to reject them when they’re based on the 
reuse of a copyrighted work for an ordinary, non-advertising exploitation of the 
work, such as releasing videotapes of a performance recorded with the performer’s 
consent.218 
McCarthy defends this result on the grounds that a right of publicity claim 
against a reuse of a recorded performance in a non-advertising context meets both 
prongs of § 301 preemption:  it is within the subject matter of copyright, he says, 
because the use involves “a copyrighted performance per se” and not voice or 
appearance.219  In addition, the claim is equivalent to a copyright right “because it 
complains solely of a reproduction or performance of the recorded performance in 
 
 216. See Laws, 448 F.3d at 1141 (“Abercrombie had not merely published the photograph.  Rather, 
it published the photo in connection with a broad surf-themed advertising campaign, identified the 
plaintiffs-surfers by name, and offered for sale the same t-shirts worn by the plaintiffs in the photo.  By 
doing so, it had suggested that the surfers had endorsed Abercrombie’s t-shirts.”).  The Laws court also 
contended that the previous cases involved the use of names and likenesses, which aren’t within the 
subject matter of copyright, id., but the use the Laws plaintiff sued over also involved the use of her 
name, id. at 1143, and so that couldn’t provide a factual basis for distinguishing the cases.  Instead, the 
court apparently allowed the use of the performer’s name to accurately identify her where copyright 
preemption prevented a claim based on the performance itself, a sort of tag-along preemption. 
 217. Possibly underlying the divergent results is some idea of where the selling power came from 
in each advertisement.  In this interpretation, the picture in the Abercrombie & Fitch case was 
transparent and only represented the reality of the surfers, and any picture of them could have done the 
same job of selling the products using them.  Songs might seem more specific, more tied to a particular 
performance, thus more dependent on the copyrightable elements of the advertisement—although the 
empirics of this are debatable at best.  There’s an interesting factual wrinkle here—Abercrombie & Fitch 
sold replicas of the clothes the surfers were wearing in that particular photo.  Downing v. Abercrombie 
& Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2001).  So in some sense, no other photo might have done for that 
specific catalog, though perhaps the company would have created different clothes using a different 
photo. 
 218. See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1029 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding no 
preemption for advertising use:  “The rationale is that state law has a role in regulating practices of 
trade, including advertising.  But limiting the way that material can be used in expressive works extends 
beyond the purview of state law and into the domain of copyright law.”); see also 1 MELVILLE B. 
NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][3][b][iv][l] (rev. ed. 2013) (surveying 
relevant case law and finding a general advertising/non-advertising divide in preemption); cf. Ray v. 
ESPN, Inc., No. 13-1179-CV, 2014 WL 2766187, at *5 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 8, 2014) (finding preemption 
where defendant “air[ed] video recordings depicting [plaintiff] in a ‘work of authorship,’ which is 
plainly encompassed by copyright law”).  But cf. Kristen E. Riccard, Product Placement or Pure 
Entertainment? Critiquing a Copyright-Preemption Proposal, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 427 (2009) (arguing 
that the commercial/noncommercial divide for finding preemption doesn’t make sense and improperly 
weighs the state publicity interest compared to the federal copyright interest). 
 219. 2 MCCARTHY, supra note 2, § 11:55 & n.9 (advocating for preemption when a defendant 
“reproduces a recorded performance in an expressive, non-advertising medium”). 
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an accused expressive work that is not an advertisement or promotion.”220  Thus, 
there’s no “additional element” of advertising or promotion.221 
McCarthy’s explanation isn’t persuasive, even if his preferred policy outcome 
makes sense.  As to the first point, the idea that a non-advertising use involves “a 
copyrighted performance per se” can’t distinguish a noncommercial use from an ad.  
McCarthy asserts that “[t]he subject matter [where a performance is used in 
advertising] is identity, not the recorded performance per se.”222  Unless the 
defendant is engaged in live, unrecorded performance, the defendant’s use will 
involve a copyrighted representation of the subject.  Voice or appearance, if those 
are present in an ad, will only be present in some fixed, expressive work, just as 
they would be in a non-advertising work.223  Further, a non-advertising work may 
well use a celebrity’s name, which is not protected by copyright and which is a core 
component of “identity.”  To say that a right of publicity claim has identity as its 
subject matter if and only if it is incorporated in an ad is merely to state a 
conclusion. 
Perhaps the thought is that, in an ad, it’s the celebrity’s aura that’s being sought, 
whereas in a non-ad it’s just the specific fixed performance.  But that’s a factual 
distinction, not a conceptual one, and it’s not very persuasive on its own terms.  
Ads that use a particular sound recording, or a particular well-known sports play, 
are trading on a specific fixed performance—other instances of the celebrity’s work 
wouldn’t make the same point.224  And non-advertising uses can readily appeal to 
the overall aura of a celebrity, as a notable sports painter did when he painted Tiger 
Woods in multiple poses.225 
But it is McCarthy’s second point, his contention that there’s no “extra element” 
to a right of publicity claim beyond mere copying unless the defendant’s use is in 
an ad, that makes clear that the preemption for which he is arguing isn’t § 301 
 
 220. Id.  
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. § 11:55; cf. Thomas F. Cotter & Irina Y. Dmitrieva, Integrating the Right of Publicity with 
First Amendment and Copyright Preemption Analysis, 33 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 165 (2010) (arguing for 
conflict preemption of right of publicity claims in cases involving noncommercial speech, unless the 
state interest is in protecting personal privacy, individual autonomy or consumer deception); Paul Heald, 
Federal Intellectual Property Law and the Economics of Preemption, 76 IOWA L. REV. 959, 998–1000 
(1991) (suggesting preemption when the right gives incentives to create a copyrighted work and not 
when the incentives are to create a non-copyrighted work).   
 223. Cf. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (advertising is within the 
subject matter of copyright, if the work is otherwise copyrightable).   
 224. See, e.g., Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007 (3d. Cir. 2008) (sports announcer’s 
specific statement about football added to promotional value of film); Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 
F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001) (advertisement was structured around Miss Piggy’s insertion into the role of “The 
Girl from Ipanema,” where the song was performed by plaintiff); see also Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 
849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (Ford’s campaign depended on evoking a particular generational moment, 
using a song associated with Bette Midler from the relevant period). 
 225. See ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ’g, Inc., 332 F. 3d 915, 936 (6th Cir. 2003) (finding that a 
painting showing three different views of Tiger Woods implicitly argued that he deserved a place in the 
pantheon of golf). 
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preemption.226  Requiring that an actionable use be in an ad isn’t an “extra 
element.”227  Although the case law is confused, narrowing the set of actionable 
cases (e.g., intentional copying, or here, copying in the form of an ad) does not add 
an extra element, as long as copying within the set is all that is required for 
liability.228  Rather, an extra element requires something in addition to copying in 
order to trigger liability, such as consumer confusion about whether a celebrity 
endorsed a product because a picture of her appeared in an ad for that product.  
Confusion is an element that must separately be proven and that would make the 
advertising actionable even if the confusion stemmed from something 
noncopyrightable, such as use of her name alone without a photo.229 
A more persuasive explanation for these inconsistent results is that courts think 
that allowing performers to control ordinary, non-advertising exploitation of a 
copyright would interfere too much with copyright owners’ rights, and allowing 
them to control ads generally doesn’t (at least when the ads involve visual uses as 
opposed to sound recordings).230  To put it another way, the right of publicity’s 
core function is to control uses in advertising; copyright’s core function is not.  One 
could even reason that, whether or not a state requires written consent to avoid a 
 
 226. See also Chadwick & Vatanparast, supra note 195, at 6 (“[R]ight of publicity claims should 
be preempted unless the use at issue (1) goes beyond the reproduction, display, distribution, or sale of a 
copyrighted or copyrightable work containing a person’s name, likeness, or voice, for example a 
photograph, movie, or audio recording; and (2) states or implies the endorsement of products or 
services.”).  The idea of “going beyond” copying in this context expresses a strong feeling that an 
advertisement is different from non-advertising speech, but doesn’t usefully distinguish the right of 
publicity from misappropriation, which is regularly preempted when all it requires is copying plus some 
concept of unfairness.  See, e.g., LaChapelle v. Fenty, 812 F. Supp. 2d 434, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) 
(“[U]nfair competition and misappropriation claims grounded solely in the copying of a plaintiff’s 
protected expression are preempted by the Copyright Act.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets 
omitted). 
 227. Cf. Bauer, supra note 195, at 80 (concluding that courts sometimes “incorrectly allow the 
state law claims to proceed by giving too narrow a scope to the ‘subject matter of copyright’ or by 
taking too credulous a view of the proffered ‘extra element’”); see also Moore, supra note Error! 
Bookmark not defined., at 204 (arguing that current application of the extra element test is “circular in 
practice,” and that the cases are “ad hoc, inconsistent, or wrong”). 
 228. Computer Assocs. Int’l Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 717 (2d Cir. 1992) (“An action will 
not be saved from preemption by elements such as awareness or intent, which alter ‘the action’s scope 
but not its nature . . . .’” (citation omitted)); Laws v. Sony Music Entm’t, Inc., 448 F.3d 1134, 1144–45 
(9th Cir. 2006) (commercial use requirement was not a sufficient extra element; it did not transform the 
nature of the action, because the right at issue was still violated by reproduction). 
 229. See, e.g., Samara Bros., Inc. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 165 F.3d 120, 131 (2d Cir. 1998), rev’d 
on other grounds, 529 U.S. 205 (2000).  However, the “inherent misrepresentation” involved in copying 
is not enough to avoid preemption.  Kluber Skahan & Assocs., Inc. v. Cordogen, Clark & Assoc., Inc., 
No. 08-cv-1529, 2009 WL 466812, at *10 (N.D.Ill. Feb. 25, 2009 ). 
 230. To the extent that copyright does provide incentives to create, the advertising/non-advertising 
distinction may not be well justified.  Copyright owners of noncommercial works—songs, for 
example—may receive marginal incentive benefits from the prospect of licensing their works for use in 
advertising.  As a result, interfering with the ability to use existing, initially non-advertising works in 
later advertising conflicts with the copyright owner’s exclusive rights in the same way that interfering 
with the ability to create non-advertising derivative works does, though perhaps the interference is worth 
tolerating for other reasons, such as the risks of creating a perceived endorsement or a person’s special 
interest in avoiding having her identity used for advertising.   
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right of publicity claim, for federal purposes a voluntary appearance in a 
copyrighted work constitutes an implicit license to the copyright owner to exploit 
the performer’s right of publicity, at least up to the point where the work is used to 
sell some other product.  However the argument is framed, this implicit reasoning 
is fundamentally about conflict preemption, not grounded in § 301’s “extra 
element” test.231  Conflict preemption occurs when a state law interferes too much 
with a federal statute’s aims, and can operate even when there’s also an explicit 
preemption provision.232 
Recall that the incentive story for the right of publicity—that the right 
encourages the production of celebrity identity—is highly similar to the incentive 
story for copyright, given that celebrity identity is essentially always disseminated 
through expressive works.  Conflict preemption is often appropriate where a state 
tries to encourage production of works within the general scope of copyright or 
patent law, regardless of whether those works are copyrightable or patentable.233  
The incentive overlap when a person has voluntarily agreed to be in a copyrighted 
work therefore provides additional justification for conflict preemption, 
supplementing copyright owners’ interest in exploiting their works as Congress 
intended them to be free to do. 
Professor Jennifer Rothman has provided the most comprehensive examination 
of conflict preemption beyond § 301.234  She argues that the right of publicity is 
justified not just by incentive theory, but also by natural rights to protect one’s 
identity and by a concern about unjust enrichment.235  Nonetheless, the right ought 
to be limited to allow others appropriate freedoms.  Rothman suggests that conflict 
 
 231. See Laws, 448 F.3d at 1145 (“We sense that, left to creative legal arguments, the developing 
right of publicity could easily supplant the copyright scheme.  This, Congress has expressly precluded in 
§ 301.  Were we to conclude that [plaintiff’s] voice misappropriation claim was not preempted by the 
Copyright Act, then virtually every use of a copyrighted sound recording would infringe upon the 
original performer’s right of publicity . . . .  It is hard to imagine how a copyright would remain 
meaningful if its licensees were potentially subject to suit from any performer anytime the copyrighted 
material was used.”).  The court speaks of § 301, but its concerns are really about the integrity of the 
copyright system. 
 232. See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 867 (2000). 
 233. See Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (“To allow a State by use 
of its law of unfair competition to prevent the copying of an article which represents too slight an 
advance to be patented would be to permit the State to block off from the public something which 
federal law has said belongs to the public.”); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231–32 
(1964) (same); see also Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 156–57 (1989) 
(explaining that states can pursue consumer protection objectives, but not seek to encourage production 
directly by granting monopoly rights over federally unprotected articles).  But see Kewanee Oil Co. v. 
Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (finding no conflict between state trade secret law and patent law 
where the type of conduct targeted was substantially different, even if trade secret protection also had 
incentive effects).  Although the Court mostly discussed patent law in these cases, it has made clear that 
its rationale applies to both patent and copyright.  See Compco, 376 U.S. at 237; Sears, 376 U.S. at 232–
33.  Congress’ power to grant exclusive rights in creative works and inventions, after all, comes from the 
same constitutional clause. 
 234. Rothman, supra note 200; see also Cotter & Dmitrieva, supra note 222 (arguing for conflict 
preemption principles to achieve similar results). 
 235. See Rothman, supra note 200, at 245–46. 
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preemption should preclude a right of publicity claim when:  (1) the claim is based 
solely on appropriation of a “persona” rather than a likeness, image, voice or 
name;236 (2) the right holder consented to the original work and the use is either by 
the copyright holder or a licensee or (3) the right holder consented to the original 
work and the work is used by the public in a way that is explicitly allowed by the 
Copyright Act.237 
Rothman’s second scenario would allow most of the uses in advertising in the 
cases discussed above.238  Advertisers could license an image of a celebrity taken 
with her consent,239 though they couldn’t commission a realistic drawing without 
infringing, even though both the photographer and the graphic artists own 
copyrighted works.  The preemption Rothman proposes would stem from the 
interference with the full exploitation of a voluntarily obtained representation of the 
celebrity.  Consent doesn’t fully solve the copyright conflict Rothman is targeting, 
since there are many situations in which a person’s consent isn’t required to 
incorporate them into a copyrighted work (e.g., a news photo of a newsworthy 
event), and the owner of such a work should also be able to exploit it.  Moreover, 
there are public policy reasons to allow some unconsented uses of copyrighted 
works in ads.240  Similar rationales apply to the right of publicity:  why not allow a 
Lindsay Lohan parody in an ad even if she didn’t consent to her mug shot?  But 
that may just be to say that preemption can’t do all the work of protecting lawful 
commercial speech from the right of publicity.241  Ultimately, the First Amendment 
needs to play a role as well. 
In practice, Rothman’s proposal would mean that preemption would preclude 
right of publicity claims when the copyrighted work being used is a standard sound 
recording, where consent is virtually inherent in the existence of the work.  
Preemption would by contrast be patchy for film and images.  It would protect the 
rights of copyright owners of planned audiovisual productions—feature films and 
TV shows—but not the rights of news photographers or paparazzi.  Here we have a 
distinction between images and sounds that stems from conditions of production, 
which even if imperfect is more justifiable than the other distinctions in this field. 
 
 236. This element of Rothman’s test solves a separate problem, which I have not addressed in text, 
about the expansion of the right of publicity so that it now covers even reminding people of a celebrity, 
regardless of whether it is obvious that the celebrity herself is not being represented.  See, e.g., White v. 
Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512 (Kozinski, J., dissenting from denial of reh’g en banc). 
 237. See Rothman, supra note 200, at 252. 
 238. See id. at 250 (arguing that, where the subject consented to appear in the work, the copyright 
owner should be able to use works in advertising by default in the absence of a contract to the contrary). 
 239. Cf. Jones v. Corbis Corp., 815 F. Supp. 2d 1108 (C.D. Cal. 2011).  The celebrity might 
nonetheless have a false endorsement claim in some circumstances.  The proper reach of trademark law, 
including false endorsement, is beyond the scope of this Article. 
 240. See, e.g., Sony Computer Entm’t Am., Inc. v. Bleem, LLC, 214 F.3d 1022 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(comparative advertising); Eveready Battery Co., Inc. v. Adolph Coors Co., 765 F. Supp. 440 (N.D. Ill. 
1991) (parody). 
 241. See Rothman, supra note 200, at 255, 261 (stating that preemption should not apply when the 
copyright owner didn’t consent to the use, though apparently assuming that such uses would always 
infringe rather than being potentially fair use). 
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Why are all these attempts at line-drawing so messy?  Preemption has given 
courts such conniptions because they lose track of the intangible rights conferred 
by copyright when looking at the intangible rights conferred by the right of 
publicity.  A celebrity may be represented in an image, but not completely 
contained or defined by it; the person has an existence beyond the image.  
According to the dominant analysis, this existence then means that regulation of the 
content (the celebrity identity as captured in the image) is not the same as 
regulation of the image itself, which would be preempted by copyright.  However, 
under current copyright law, the copyrighted work itself has the same feature—its 
legal existence extends beyond its fixation to cover substantially similar copies and 
derivative works.  The rights conferred by ownership extend beyond the work’s 
four corners, to all the possible works that would qualify as substantially similar or 
derivative works.242  Many of those substantially similar or derivative works would 
also use the celebrity’s identity, precisely because of their similarity to the original.  
Thus, neither the celebrity image nor the copyrighted work in which it appears is 
limited to one particular instantiation. 
This difficulty grappling with the emanations of rights also occurs in another 
area of intersection in copyright and publicity law:  when the relevant images are of 
actors “in character,” not just as themselves, copyright owners claim to own the 
character as an overall entity and individual images that depict the character.243  
Courts upholding “character copyrights” generally recognize a copyright in the 
visual aspects of character, detached from the particular work in which the 
 
 242. On this point, scholars across the spectrum from copyright skeptics to copyright high-
protectionists agree.  See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF:  LAW, CODE, 
AND THE PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE 76 (2012) (“Identification of expression divorced from 
animating ideas as the appropriate subject of ownership . . . generates broad rights that negate defenses 
based on the transposition of expression into different forms.  Thus it makes sense to conclude, for 
example, that the copyrightable expression in a film inheres in its characters in a way that transcends the 
particular actions scripted for them . . . .”); ROBERT MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 59 
(2011) (“The way IP law operates, the creator of the work will almost always be able to obtain a 
property right that extends beyond the original embodiment of the work.  The property right will almost 
always cover the original embodiment plus some number of variations on the original . . . . It is this class 
or genus, this set of all variants on the original work, that is the real subject of IP law.”); Anthony Casey 
& Andres Sawicki, Copyright in Teams, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1726–27 (2013) (“The first novel in a 
series has no protection until the novel is written; but after that, something closer to the idea of a sequel 
has substantial protection under the derivative-works right . . . . And at a minimum, the derivative-works 
right protects expression that the holder of the right has yet to fix in a tangible medium.”); Daniel 
Gervais, The Derivative Right, or Why Copyright Law Protects Foxes Better Than Hedgehogs, 15 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 785, 792 (2013) (“Indeed, introducing a right against unauthorized 
translations and dramatizations implied that something protectable lay beneath a work’s literal surface.  
What now may seem obvious was in fact a major shift.  It opened up a new path for copyright under 
which substantial as well as literal copies could infringe.  It also created a climate hospitable to a 
significant expansion of copyright . . . .” (footnote omitted)); Michael J. Madison, The End of the Work 
as We Know It, 19 J. INTELL PROP. L. 325, 352 (2012) (“Over the course of the nineteenth century, 
copyright law evolved the idea of the work as a thing abstracted from material form.”) 
 243. See, e.g., Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. X One X Prods., 644 F.3d 584 (8th Cir. 2011) (Wizard 
of Oz characters); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 900 F. Supp. 1287 (C.D. 
Cal. 1995) (James Bond). 
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character appears, even when the visual appearance derives from the physical 
attributes of the actor portraying the character.244  Thus, MGM would control the 
copyright in a doll depicting a Dorothy Gale who looks like Judy Garland, even 
though a doll isn’t substantially similar to the overall work MGM owns, The 
Wizard of Oz.  But if the copyright owner owns rights in the visual aspects of 
character detached from any particular work, that seems very hard to distinguish 
from an actor’s likeness—both rights would seem to cover the same subject matter 
and to be infringed simply by copying.  Right now, copyright owners control 
“characters” as against third parties, while performers’ publicity rights may 
interfere with licensed exploitation of those characters.245  But the very 
detachability of a visual character from the specific work in which she appears 
should lead to the conclusion that both rights protect the same subject matter, and 
thus that right of publicity claims based on character reuse are preempted. 
The ultimate issue is that copyright, like the right of publicity, extends rights in 
a work beyond its tangible contents to a broader “copyrighted work.”  Thus, the 
idea that a right of publicity/persona is also intangible and impossible to nail down 
in any one physical instantiation isn’t itself a barrier to preemption, especially 
conflict preemption.  Where the right of publicity has the same incentivizing aim, 
 
 244. See Kurtz, supra note 101, at 448 (noting this problem and arguing that “the creative 
expression protected by copyright cannot be found in the physiognomy of the actor or the shape of 
ordinary clothing.  Rocky looks remarkably similar to Rambo and James Bond, played by a variety of 
actors, appears differently from film to film”).  Kurtz concludes that, for preemption purposes, copyright 
owners should be able to exploit their characters in non-advertising uses, and thus to use elements of a 
performer’s persona to the extent that the performer was performing the character.  Id. at 470 (“The 
basic question that should be asked is whether it is the character that is being used, or whether it is 
simply the performer in disguise.  If the value of the challenged work is derived primarily from the 
character, rather than the fame of the actor playing the character, the right of publicity should not 
apply.”).  I find this reasoning unsatisfying, since Kurtz relies on the claim that “the bulk of the 
economic value comes from the portrayal of the character rather than the resemblance to the actor.”  Id.  
This doesn’t seem to describe many popular characters tightly associated with their actors, such Arnold 
Schwarzenegger’s iconic Terminator and Sylvester Stallone’s iconic Rambo.  Cf. Michael J. Albano, 
Nothing to “Cheer” About:  A Call for Reform of the Right of Publicity in Audiovisual Characters, 90 
GEO. L.J. 253, 288, 290 (2001) (pointing out that it is difficult for courts to “accurately distinguish 
between those elements of a character created solely by writers and those attributed to [the] human 
persona,” but at the same time proposing to “grant an actor a federal right of publicity in a character she 
portrays when she is the substantial creative force behind the character or when the character has 
become so associated with the actor that they are inseparable to the public eye”).  Even if these 
characters could be rebooted with new actors, like the Star Trek actors, that doesn’t mean that the 
economic value didn’t begin with tight identification between the actor and the role.  Or consider Brad 
Pitt and Angelina Jolie’s Mr. and Mrs. Smith.  Could anyone seriously contend that the gun-toting titular 
characters are in any way recognizable other than as extensions of the stars’ personae?  Yet it seems to 
me that the copyright owner of that movie should have as much right to exploit its copyright as the 
copyright owner of Star Trek.  Ultimately, determining where “value” comes from in an artistic work is 
likely to remain as tricky an endeavor in dividing characters from their actors as it is in evaluating 
transformativeness in First Amendment defenses to right of publicity claims.  The game of regulating 
noncommercial speech isn’t worth the candle. 
 245. See Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc., 125 F.3d 806 (9th Cir. 1997) (allowing actors who portrayed 
Cheers characters to prevent the owner of the Cheers copyright from licensing creation of derivative 
works). 
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but protects what copyright law chooses to leave unprotected—the fact of a 
celebrity name, appearance, etc., or a fair use—conflict preemption would be 
appropriate.  Use in advertising may implicate endorsement concerns and avoid 
conflict preemption, but copyright should be a barrier to celebrity control of artistic 
works.  None of this analysis directly depends on a special role for images, but the 
presence of so many image-related cases seems to have contributed to the multiple 
inconsistencies permeating preemption analysis in right of publicity law. 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
I have largely relied on a syllogism throughout:  to begin with, the First 
Amendment doesn’t allow celebrities to control most uses of their names in non-
advertising speech, even when that speech is sold for profit.  If, as I argue, there’s 
no constitutionally relevant distinction between names and images, then allowing 
celebrities to control most uses of their images in non-advertising speech is equally 
unconstitutional.  I haven’t spent much time on the first part of the argument.  In 
theory, we might respond to this inequality by giving celebrities expanded control 
over textual uses as well.  As the Restatement of Unfair Competition’s definitional 
exclusion of biographies and the like from the right of publicity shows,246 however, 
it has generally seemed obvious even to proponents of the right that others’ 
interests in freedom of expression trump celebrity interests in controlling non-
advertising writing about them, in the absence of defamation or invasion of 
privacy. 
As many other scholars have written, freedom to engage in discourse about 
celebrities is an important part of our public discussions about culture, politics, 
morality and other pressing issues.247  Celebrities, by concentrating our attention 
and interest, are good to think with.  Whether it’s the appropriate effect of domestic 
violence on a person’s career,248 the wisdom of prophylactic mastectomies for 
 
 246. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 47 cmt. a (1995). 
 247. A small sampling includes:  Stephen R. Barnett, First Amendment Limits on the Right of 
Publicity, 30 TORT & INS. L.J. 635 (1995); Rosemary J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity:  Publicity 
Rights, Postmodern Politics, and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 365 (1992); 
Rosemary J. Coombe, Objects of Property and Subjects of Politics:  Intellectual Property Laws and 
Democratic Dialogue, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1853 (1991); David Tan, Political Recoding of the 
Contemporary Celebrity and the First Amendment, 2 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 1 (2011); Eugene 
Volokh, Freedom of Speech and The Right of Publicity, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 903 (2003); Diane Leenheer 
Zimmerman, Fitting Publicity Rights Into Intellectual Property And Free Speech Theory:  Sam, You 
Made The Pants Too Long!, 10 DEPAUL-LCA J. ART & ENT. L. 283 (2000); see also Ralph S. Brown, 
Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins:  Privacy, Publicity, Unfair Competition:  The Sixteenth Donald C. 
Brace Memorial Lecture, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 301 (1986) (criticizing expansion beyond false 
endorsement); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image:  Popular Culture and Publicity 
Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV. 127 (1993) (making similar claims about the importance of celebrity 
representations for making meaning, but expressing lack of faith in courts’ willingness to use the First 
Amendment to restrict the right of publicity). 
 248. See, e.g., Barry Petchesky, Someone Is Lying About Whether The NFL Saw the Ray Rice 
Tape, DEADSPIN (Sept. 8, 2014, 11:21 AM), http://perma.cc/RGS3-W9EP (discussing controversy over 
the NFL’s mild sanction of the Baltimore Ravens’ Ray Rice for brutally assaulting his fiancée). 
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women with a genetic predisposition to breast cancer,249 the implications of public 
sexual expression and of white women imitating African-American culture,250 or 
any other topic of public note, celebrities offer important reference points enabling 
broader discussion.  Moreover, the First Amendment elsewhere provides a strong 
default rule:  the speaker does not need to justify her choice of how to speak in the 
first instance.  Instead, the government must offer a good reason to regulate her 
speech, even if that speech seems trivial, exploitative or merely entertaining 
without broader implications.  Our constitutional history provides too many 
examples of those in power judging the speech of the powerless to be unworthy to 
allow us to say with confidence that NCAA Football or Grand Theft Auto are 
unimportant speech. 
Largely insulated from these concerns, the right of publicity has been making 
bad law for decades now.  One reason is its tight link with the legal regulation of 
images, where courts are routinely inconsistent.  The tortured path of the right of 
publicity demonstrates the dangers of insufficiently defining the scope of an 
intellectual property right, especially when the regulated texts are incompletely 
understood by courts.  More serious attention to the communicative nature of 
images, as opposed to continued equation of an image with the person it represents, 
would lead to a substantial contraction of the right of publicity.  While there may 
well be normative and practical reasons to provide a special legal rule for 
unconsented representation of people in ads, current law wrongly allows the 
suppression of substantial amounts of non-advertising speech—when the speech 
involves images.  Instead of corroding free speech rights, our doctrine should 
protect artists who draw with their pencils as much as artists who write with them. 
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